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Is time-varying firm-level uncertainty a major cause or amplifier of the business cycle? This 
paper investigates this question in the context of a heterogeneous-firm RBC model with 
persistent firm-level productivity shocks and lumpy capital adjustment, where cyclical 
changes in uncertainty correspond naturally to cyclical changes in the cross-sectional 
dispersion of firm-specific Solow residual innovations. We use a German firm-level data set 
to investigate the extent to which firm-level uncertainty varies over the cycle. This allows us 
to put empirical discipline on our numerical simulations. We find that, while firm-level 
uncertainty is indeed countercyclical, it does not fluctuate enough to significantly alter the 
dynamics of an RBC model with only first moment shocks. The mild changes we do find are 
mainly caused by a bad news effect: higher uncertainty today predicts lower aggregate 
Solowresiduals tomorrow. This effect dominates the real option value effect of time-varying 
uncertainty, highlighted in the literature. 
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“Crises feed uncertainty. And uncertainty affects behaviour, which feeds
the crisis. [...] But there is more at work. If you think that another Depres-
sion might be around the corner, better to be careful and save more.“
IMF Chief Economist, Olivier Blanchard, in: The Economist, 29 January, 2009
Is time-varying ﬁrm-level uncertainty a major cause or ampliﬁer of the business cycle? This
paper investigates this question in the context of a heterogeneous-ﬁrm RBC model with per-
sistent ﬁrm-level productivity shocks and lumpy capital adjustment. We make three contribu-
tions to the existing literature: ﬁrst, we discipline the calibration of time-varying uncertainty
as a driving force through a detailed analysis of the behavior of the cross-section of ﬁrms over
thecycle, ratherthanthroughstockmarketdata; secondly, weanalyzetheimplicationsoftime-
varying uncertainty in the context of a general equilibrium framework and using the detailed
unconditionalandconditionalsecondmomentanalysisofmodel-simulatedaggregatetimese-
riesthathasbecomeastandardtoolinthebusinesscycleliterature; and, thirdly, weshowanew
mechanism through which uncertainty shocks have (mild) aggregate effects: a bad news effect,
rather than the time-varying option value effect (wait-and-see) that has been highlighted thus
far (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, Hassler, 1996 and 2001, and, more recently, Bloom, 2009). We ﬁnd
the wait-and-see-effect to be dominated by the bad news effect.
In the aforementioned model context, cyclical changes in uncertainty correspond naturally
to cyclical changes in the cross-section of ﬁrms – more speciﬁcally the dispersions of change
rates of ﬁrm-level Solow residuals, real value added and real sales. Thus, using the balance
sheet data set of Deutsche Bundesbank (USTAN) – a private sector, annual, ﬁrm-level data set
that allows us to investigate 26 years of data (1973-1998), in which the cross-sections of the
panel have over 30,000 ﬁrms per year on average, and which has a broad ownership, size and
sectoral coverage –, we ﬁrst show that the cross-sectional standard deviations of the ﬁrm-level
innovations in the Solow residual, real value added and sales are indeed robustly and signif-




volatility in uncertainty over the cycle is substantially lower than has been considered in the lit-
erature. These two results are essentially robust to different choices for the cyclical indicator, to
alternative calculations of the Solow residual, to various changes in the sample selection crite-
ria and to explicitly considering cyclical sample selection and measurement error in the micro
data. We also use IFO survey data on business expectations to conﬁrm our ﬁndings. Figure 1 il-
2lustrates the countercyclicality of ﬁrm-level risk. It displays for Germany the annual time series
of the dispersion of ﬁrm-level Solow residual innovations, linearly detrended, and the cyclical
component of GDP, as measured by log-HP(100) ﬁltered aggregate output.1
Figure 1: Time Series of the Dispersion of Firm-Level Solow Residual Innovations and the Cycli-
cal Component of GDP













Notes: std: cross-sectional standard deviation, linearly detrended and normalized by the average dispersion.
HP(¸)¡Y : Cyclical component of log-GDP after HP-ﬁltering using smoothing parameter ¸.
We then explore the quantitative importance of these shocks to uncertainty in a
heterogeneous-ﬁrm RBC model similar to the one in Khan and Thomas (2008) and Bachmann
et al. (2008). We have developed the computational techniques to study time-varying uncer-
tainty in general equilibrium in parallel with Bloom et al. (2009). We ﬁnd that uncertainty
shocks alone - if of a size in line with our empirical evidence - do not introduce quantitatively
signiﬁcant business cycle ﬂuctuations. Moreover, purely uncertainty driven business cycles
lead to counterfactual acyclicality of aggregate consumption.
Shocks to uncertainty nonetheless modestly alter the aggregate behavior of the model if
they are introduced alongside standard ﬁrst moment ﬂuctuations in aggregate Solow residuals
and compared to a model with only these ﬁrst moment shocks (essentially the standard RBC
1See Appendix B.1 for analogous ﬁgures for the time series of the dispersions of ﬁrm-level innovations to value
added and sales, as well as scatter plots between dispersion measures and the cyclical component of GDP .
3model). Yet, this change does not come through the real options effect often associated with
time-varying uncertainty. Instead, we identify a new economic channel, by which ﬂuctuations
in uncertainty inﬂuence the business cycle that results only from their correlation with aggre-
gate productivity. Since changes in uncertainty empirically correlate with future developments
in the aggregate Solow residual, the former constitute news about the latter.
Speciﬁcally,weﬁndthatanincreaseinproductivityriskessentiallyactsasabadnewsshock.
In general equilibrium, this means that households decrease their consumption and increase
their labor supply, which we ﬁnd to be consistent with the data. We also ﬁnd a decrease in the
realwageasaresultofashocktouncertaintynotonlyinourmodelbutagainalsointheimpulse
response function of the data. As a result of this decrease in wages, we ﬁnd – again both in the
dataaswellasinourmodel–anincreaseineconomicactivityatthemomentoftheuncertainty
shock,followedbyarecession,whenthepredicteddownturninproductivityoccurs. Theeffects
of uncertainty shocks that we ﬁnd in our model almost entirely operate through this channel.
Comparing a partial equilibrium version to our general equilibrium model in terms of the
impulse response functions of investment with respect to shocks to uncertainty illustrates this
mechanism further. While in partial equilibrium the bad news on impact causes aggregate in-
vestment activity to collapse, in general equilibrium, this effect is reversed by the decrease in
the real interest rate, such that investment rates even expand on impact and only turn negative
as lower productivity actually realizes. Indeed, the point estimate of the empirical impulse re-
sponsefunctionofuncertaintyonnationalsavingispositiveonimpact. Thisshowsthatgeneral
equilibrium analysis is paramount in understanding the aggregate effects of ﬁrm-level uncer-
tainty shocks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our data set, the
USTANdata, discussesbrieﬂytheselectionoftheﬁnalsampleanddetailsourempiricalresults.
Section 3 explains the model. Section 4 describes its calibration and Section 5 discusses the
numerical results. Appendices provide more details on the data set, give further robustness
checks for the empirical ﬁndings as well as for the simulation results.
Related Literature
Over the last two decades, the economic literature has used models with ﬁxed costs of capi-
tal adjustment or irreversibility as a natural starting point to study the effects of uncertainty on
economic activity (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). More recently, Bloom (2009) and Bloom
et al. (2009) document that increases in stock market volatility are correlated with a reduction
in aggregate economic activity. The former in partial equilibrium, the latter in general equilib-
rium then provide a formal model qualitatively similar to the one used here, where an increase
inuncertaintyleadstoahigherrealoptionvalueofinvestment,lettingmoreﬁrms‘waitandsee’
4aftersuchanincrease, whichinturnleadstoafallinaggregateinvestmentandemployment. In
a similar vein and also in general equilibrium, but in a different model context, Sim (2008) puts
forth a model that explains the cyclical patterns in ﬁrms’ entry and exit with cyclical variations
in uncertainty. Gilchrist et al. (2009) explore the implications of time-varying uncertainty for
bond risk premia and via this channel for aggregate investment in a general equilibrium model.
Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009) propose the ‘number of New York Times articles on uncertainty
and economic activity’ as an alternative measure for uncertainty shocks and ﬁnd in an em-
pirical exercise that this measure of uncertainty is negatively correlated with aggregate activity.
Finally,inasomewhatdifferentcontext,Fernandez-Villaverdeet. al(2009)ﬁndthatincreasesin
interest rate volatility suppress real activity in small open emerging market economies in Latin
America.
None of the above draws its empirical evidence on broad-based cross-sectional ﬁrm data.
The data that is typically used is stock market data or analyst data available only for a subset
of large publicly traded companies or even sectoral data. Using stock market data to identify
ﬂuctuations in productivity, however, implies strong market efﬁciency assumptions (see for in-
stance Shiller, 1981). We use ﬁrm-level balance sheet data instead.2 This links the empirical
part of this paper most closely to a series of papers by Higson and Holly et al. (2002, 2004),
Doepke and Holly et al. (2005, 2008), Doepke and Weber (2006), as well as Holly and Santoro
(2008). Higson and Holly et al. (2002), using Compustat data, study empirically the cyclicality
of the standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of the sales growth rate distribution and ﬁnd
themtobecountercyclical,countercyclicalandprocyclical,respectively. HigsonandHollyetal.
(2004) repeat this analysis for UK data on quoted ﬁrms, and Doepke and Holly et al. (2005) for
Germany, using the USTAN database, with similar ﬁndings. Doepke and Weber (2006) study,
again using USTAN data, the cyclicality of transitions between sales growth regimes in ﬁrm-
level data. In contrast to these papers, we focus on the cyclicality of cross-sectional second
moments only, but include real value added and Solow residuals into the analysis. These are
arguably the right ﬁrm-level counterpart for GDP and aggregate Solow residuals, respectively.
The quantitative part of this paper draws heavily on the recent literature on heterogenous-
ﬁrm RBC models, developed in Khan and Thomas (2008) as well as Bachmann et al. (2008).
Finally, this paper is related to the work by Beaudry and Portier (2006), Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2008), Sims (2008) as well as Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) on the impact of news shocks
on business cycle dynamics. In a companion paper (Bachmann and Bayer, 2009), we focus on
the implications of countercyclical dispersion in the ﬁrm-level Solow residual innovations for
cross-sectional dynamics as opposed to aggregate dynamics.
2On the household side, using PSID data, Storesletten et al. (2004) have extensively demonstrated the counter-
cyclicality of labor income risk. This paper ﬁlls the gap on the production side of the economy.
52 The Facts
In Section 2.1 we brieﬂy describe the USTAN data set and the main sample selection criteria
we use. Details are relegated to Appendix A.1. In Section 2.2 we present the baseline facts: the
contemporaneous correlations of cyclical aggregate output and the cross-sectional standard
deviations of log changes in ﬁrm-level Solow residuals, real value added and sales are negative,
but the cyclical variations are small, at most 1.5 times the volatility of aggregate output. In
Section 2.3 we perform extensive robustness checks and also show, how these facts depend on
observable ﬁrm characteristics.
2.1 A Brief Data Description
2.1.1 USTAN Data
USTAN is a large annual ﬁrm-level balance sheet data base (Unternehmensbilanzstatistik) col-
lected by Deutsche Bundesbank. It is unique in its combination of size and coverage as well as
detail of available variables. It provides annual ﬁrm level data from 1971 to 1998 from the bal-
ance sheets and the proﬁt and loss accounts of over 60,000 ﬁrms per year (see Stoess (2001),
von Kalckreuth (2003) and Doepke et al. (2005) for further details). In the days when the dis-
countingofcommercialbillswereoneoftheprincipalinstrumentsofGermanmonetarypolicy,
Bundesbank law required the Bundesbank to assess the creditworthiness of all parties backing
a commercial bill put up for discounting. The Bundesbank implemented this regulation by re-
quiring balance sheet data of all parties involved. These balance sheet data were then archived
and collected into a database.
Although the sampling design – one’s commercial bill being put up for discounting – does
not lead to a representative selection of ﬁrms in a statistical sense, the coverage of the sample
is very broad. USTAN covers incorporated ﬁrms as well as privately-owned companies, which
distinguishes it positively from Compustat data.3 Its sectoral coverage – while still somewhat
biased to manufacturing ﬁrms – includes the construction, the service as well as the primary
sectors. This makes it different from, for instance, the Annual Survey of Manufacturing (ASM)
in the U.S.4 The following table 1 displays the sectoral coverage of our ﬁnal baseline sample.
Moreover, while there remains a bias to somewhat larger and ﬁnancially healthier ﬁrms, the
size coverage is still fairly broad: 31% of all ﬁrms in our ﬁnal baseline sample have less than
3Davis et al. (2006) show that studying only publicly traded ﬁrms can lead to wrong conclusions, in particular
when higher cross-sectional moments are concerned. See Appendix A.1 Table 27 for ownership coverage in our
ﬁnal sample.
4Anadditionaladvantageofthesedataiseasyaccess: whileaccessison-site, itispracticallyfreeforresearchers,
so that results derived from this data base can be easily tested and checked.
6Table 1: SECTORAL COVERAGE
1-digit Sector Firm-year observations Percentage
Agriculture 12,291 1.44
Mining & Energy 4,165 0.49
Manufacturing 405,787 47.5
Construction 54,569 6.39
Trade (Retail & Wholesale) 355,208 41.59
Transportation & Communication 22,085 2.59
20 employees and 57% have less than 50 employees (see Table 25 in Appendix A.1 for details).
Finally, the Bundesbank itself frequently used the USTAN data for its macroeconomic analyses
and for cross-checking national accounting data. We take this as an indication that the bank
considers the data as sufﬁciently representative and of sufﬁciently high quality. This makes the
USTANdataanexceptionallysuitabledatasourceforthestudyofcross-sectionalbusinesscycle
dynamics.
2.1.2 Selection of the Baseline Sample
FromtheoriginalUSTANdata,weselectonlyﬁrmsthatreportcompleteinformationonpayroll,
gross value added and capital stocks. Moreover, we drop observations from East German ﬁrms
to avoid a break of the series in 1990. In addition, we remove observations that stem from
irregular accounting statements, e.g. when ﬁling for bankruptcy or when closing operations.
We deﬂate all but the capital and investment data by the implicit deﬂator for gross value added
from the German national accounts.
Capital is deﬂated with one-digit sector- and capital-good speciﬁc investment good price
deﬂators within a perpetual inventory method. Even though USTAN data can be considered as
particularly high quality data, we cannot directly use capital stocks as reported. Tax motivated
depreciation and price developments of capital goods lead to a general understatement of the
stock of capital a ﬁrm holds. Thus, capital stocks have to be recalculated using a perpetual
inventory method (see Appendix A.2, for details). Similarly, we recover the amount of labor
inputsfromwagebills,asinformationonthenumberofemployees(asopposedtopayrolldata)
is only updated infrequently for some companies (see Appendix A.3, for details). Finally, the
ﬁrm-level Solow residual is calculated from data on gross value added and factor inputs.
We remove outliers according to the following procedure: we calculate log changes in real
gross value added, the Solow residual, real capital and employment, as well as the ﬁrm-level in-
vestmentrateanddropallobservationswhereachangefallsoutsideathreestandarddeviations
7interval around the year-speciﬁc mean.5 We also drop those ﬁrms for which we do not have at
least ﬁve observations in ﬁrst differences. This leaves us with a sample of 854,105 ﬁrm-year
observations, which corresponds to observations on 72,853 ﬁrms, i.e. the average observation
lengthofaﬁrminthesampleis11.7years. Theaveragenumberofﬁrmsinthecross-sectionper
year is 32,850. We perform numerous robustness checks with respect to each of the selection
criteria and measurement choices: we use sectoral deﬂators for value added, an aggregate in-
vestment good price deﬂator, change the cut-off rule to 2.5 and 5 standard deviations and leave
all ﬁrms in the sample with two and twenty observations in ﬁrst differences, respectively. None
of these choices change our baseline results (see Table 38 in Appendix B.1 for details).
2.1.3 Solow Residual and Productivity Innovations
We compute the ﬁrm-level Solow residual based on the following Cobb-Douglas production




where ²i,t is ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity, and zt is aggregate productivity. We assume that
labor input ni,t is immediately productive, whereas capital ki,t is pre-determined and inherited
fromlastperiod. Inourmainspeciﬁcation,weestimatetheoutputelasticitiesoftheproduction
factors, º and µ, as median shares of factor expenditures over gross value added within each
industry.6 We use log-differences in the Solow residual to capture Solow residual innovations,
as the persistence of ﬁrm-level Solow residuals exhibits behavior close to a unit root. In order
to check, whether our results are driven by measurement error in a difﬁcult-to-measure driving
force, we also study log-differences in outcome variables: ﬁrm-level real value added and sales.
We remove ﬁrm ﬁxed and sectoral-year7 effects from these ﬁrst-difference variables to focus
on idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations that do not capture differences in sectoral responses to aggregate
shocks or permanent ex-ante heterogeneity between ﬁrms.8 We focus on the cross-sectional
5This outlier removal is done after removing ﬁrm and sectoral ﬁxed effects. Centering the outlier removal
around the year mean is important to avoid artiﬁcial and countercyclical skewness of the respective distributions.
6To check the robustness of our results, we try alternative speciﬁcations with predeﬁned elasticities common
across sectors. We also change the timing assumption to include a predetermined employment stock, as well as
immediate adjustment in both factors. All results are very robust to the alternative ways to generate the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc Solow residual (see Table 31 Appendix B.1 for details).
7The sectoral ﬁxed effects are essentially computed at the 2-digit level, see Table 24 in Appendix A.1 for details.
8 Speciﬁcally, we decompose a variable observed of ﬁrm i in sector j at time t into ﬁrm a ﬁxed effect ®i, a





We then focus on the error term "i jt.
8dispersionofthesethreevariablesandmeasurethedispersionintermsofstandarddeviations.9
In a standard model with ex-ante homogenous ﬁrms, these standard deviations characterize
the uncertainty or risk of a ﬁrm with regard to its idiosyncratic productivity growth. In line with
this, the literature – e.g. Davis et al. (2006), Bloom et al. (2007), Sim (2008), Bloom et al. (2009),
Bloom (2009) and Gilchrist et al. (2009) – has modeled ﬂuctuations in idiosyncratic uncertainty
as ﬂuctuations in the standard deviation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc innovations in the Solow residual. We
follow this view and study the quantitative aggregate importance of ﬂuctuations in the cross-
sectional dispersion of productivity innovations.
2.1.4 Macro data
When combining this micro data with aggregate data, we have to take a stance on the sectoral
aggregate that is the empirical counterpart to our model. We chose to include ﬁrms from the
following six sectors in our analysis: agriculture, mining and energy, manufacturing, construc-
tion, trade (both retail and wholesale) as well as the transportation and communication sector.
This aggregate can be roughly characterized as the non-ﬁnancial private business sector (NF-
PBS) in Germany. Whenever we use the term aggregate in the following, we mean this sector.
German national accounting data per one-digit sector (see Appendix A.1, Footnote 49, for
a detailed description of the data sources used) allow us to compute real value added, invest-
ment, capital and employment data for this sectoral aggregate, and therefore also an aggregate
Solow residual. Our USTAN sample captures on average 70% of sectoral value added and 78%
of sectoral real gross output (sales). The NFPBS, in turn, comprises 59% and 69%, respectively,
of aggregate real value added and real gross output.
In addition to representing a large part of the non-ﬁnancial private business sector in Ger-
many, USTAN also represents its cyclical behavior very well, as the following Table 2 shows:10
Table 2: CYCLICALITY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL AVERAGES




Notes: mean: cross-sectional average, linearly detrended. ½: time series correlation coefﬁcient.
HP(¸)¡Y : Cyclical component of aggregate log-GDP after HP-ﬁltering using smoothing parameter ¸. Y refers to
the output of the aggregate of the non-ﬁnancial private business sector.
9The baseline within-transformed cross-sectional data for these dispersions can be found in Table 30 in Ap-
pendix A.5.
10We further illustrate the good representation properties of USTAN in Appendix A.1.
92.2 Main Facts: Idiosyncratic Productivity Risk – Large and Countercyclical
Using the micro data from USTAN, we can compute the cross-sectional dispersions for inno-
vations in ﬁrm-level Solow residuals, real value added and real sales. We analyze both their
time-averaged long-run as well as their cyclical properties. Table 3 presents our main results:
Table 3: CYCLICALITY AND VOLATILITY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DISPERSION
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
std(¢log²i,t) 2.67% -0.481 0.120
std(¢logyi,t) 3.73% -0.451 0.142
std(¢logsalesi,t) 3.82% -0.405 0.187
Notes: std: cross-sectional standard deviation, linearly detrended. cv: time series coefﬁcient of variation. ¹: time
series average. See further notes to Table 2.
• The time-averaged cross-sectional standard deviation of the log-changes in ﬁrm-level
Solow residuals is large: 12%. In contrast, the volatility of the linearly detrended aggre-
gate Solow residual is 2.06%, i.e. an order of magnitude smaller; the one for the linearly
detrended cross-sectional average Solow residual 2.37%.11 This also means that ﬁrm-
speciﬁc productivity risk is an order of magnitude larger than in Kahn and Thomas (2008)
as well as Bloom et al. (2009) who, without the discipline of ﬁrm-level data, are using for
the standard deviation of the innovations to ﬁrm-level Solow residuals in their models:
2.2% annually.
• The cross-sectional standard deviation of the innovations to ﬁrm-level Solow residuals
is countercyclical with a correlation coefﬁcient with HP-ﬁltered aggregate GDP of -0.481.
Table 4 shows that this countercyclicality is signiﬁcant, as the 5% and 95% conﬁdence
bandsfrom10,000parametricbootstrapsimulationsarebothnegative.12 Thelastcolumn
of Table 4 displays the fraction of positive correlations in these bootstrap simulations.




by the idiosyncratic state given this difference, and ﬂuctuations in anyway small aggregate risk do not seem to be
a plausible candidate for business cycle ﬂuctuations. In addition, we ﬁnd for the cyclical components of aggregate
quarterly output and employment in Germany that moving-window volatility estimates as well as the squared
residuals from AR(1) regressions are essentially uncorrelated with the cycle.
12We use a pairwise unrestricted VAR with one lag as the parametric model. The results from a nonparametric
overlapping block bootstrap with a block size of four are similar to the parametric bootstrap.
10For comparison, Bloom et al. (2009) ﬁnd a correlation of their stock market-based uncer-
tainty index with GDP of -0.606. Gourio (2008), using Compustat data, ﬁnds the correlation
between GDP and the standard deviation of the innovation to a permanent productivity shock
to be - 0.56.13 Thus our ﬁnding aligns well in this point with previous work. For the size of
the ﬂuctuations, there is little previous evidence. In his numerical simulations, Bloom (2009)
considers a productivity process for monthly data, which exhibits a time-series coefﬁcient of
variation of the dispersion in annual productivity growth of roughly 17%.
One could be concerned that the Solow residual does not measure productivity well. For
this reason, we provide evidence also from log-differences in endogenous outcome variables,
namelyrealvalueaddedandrealsales. Asbalancesheetitemsthesearearguablylesssubjectto
measurement error.14 Using these indirect measures makes no difference: their cross-sectional
dispersions are large on average, they are signiﬁcantly countercyclical, but their business cycle
ﬂuctuations are small.
Table 4: CYCLICALITY OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DISPERSION - SIGNIFICANCE
Cross-sectional Moment ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) 5% 95% Frac. w. opposite sign
std(¢log²i,t) -0.481 -0.678 -0.306 0.000
std(¢logyi,t) -0.451 -0.675 -0.196 0.005
std(¢logsalesi,t) -0.405 -0.711 0.042 0.065
Notes: The columns 5% and 95% refer to the top and bottom 5-percentiles in a parametric bootstrap of the correla-
tion coefﬁcient. The last column displays the fraction of simulations with the opposite sign of the point estimate.
See further notes to Tables 2 and 3.
2.3 Robustness
Two questions arise: ﬁrst, are these results sensitive to the choice of the cyclical indicator and
thedispersionmeasureused? Secondly, aretheydrivenbysamplecompositionorcyclicalsam-
ple selection? We show they are not.
Cyclical Indicator and Dispersion Measure
The following Table 5 shows that countercyclical idiosyncratic uncertainty as measured by
the cross-sectional dispersion of ﬁrm-level Solow residual innovations is robust to the choice of
the cyclical indicator (for std(¢logyi,t) and std(¢logsalesi,t) see Table 32 in Appendix B.1).
13Interestingly, Comin and Mulani (2006), using also Compustat data, ﬁnd procyclicality of a moving-standard
deviation estimator of ﬁrm-level risk in real sales innovations.
14Bachmann and Bayer (2009) show that when looking at inputs, log-changes in ﬁrm-level employment are sim-
ilarly countercyclical, ﬁrm-level investment rates are strongly and signiﬁcantly procyclical.








Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3. N refers to aggregate employment.
The result stands irrespective of whether we choose as cyclical indicators output ﬁltered
using a smaller smoothing parameter for the HP ﬁlter, following Ravn and Uhlig (2002), apply a
log-difference ﬁlter to output, or use the linearly detrended average cross-sectional investment
rate, or the HP(100)-ﬁltered aggregate employment, or aggregate Solow residuals.
Vice versa, as Table 6 shows, our three ﬁndings are also robust to the numerous choices we
have made for the other part of the correlation, std(¢log²i,t), for instance (for std(¢logyi,t)
and std(¢logsalesi,t)seeTable33inAppendixB.1). Forinstance, onecanusetheinterquartile
range (iqr) as the dispersion measure. Moreover, it is not the removal of ﬁrm-level and sectoral
ﬁxed effects that induces the countercyclicality, as row three of this table shows. Finally, the last
two rows demonstrate that the results are neither driven by the German reuniﬁcation, nor by
the strong recession in 1975.
Table 6: MORE ROBUSTNESS
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
std(¢log²i,t)Baseline 2.67% -0.481 0.120
iqr(¢log²i,t) 4.56% -0.386 0.130
std(¢log²i,t)raw 2.90% -0.449 0.126
std(¢log²i,t)1973¡1990 2.51% -0.680 0.121
std(¢log²i,t)1977¡1998 2.55% -0.375 0.119
Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3. iqr stands for interquartile range, which is linearly detrended.
Sample Composition
USTAN is no random sample. Consequently, we need to check whether our ﬁndings are
speciﬁc to certain sectors or types of ﬁrms overrepresented in this sample. Our ﬁndings for
std(¢log²i,t) in Tables 7 to 915 are twofold: on the one hand, we ﬁnd that qualitatively our em-
15For std(¢logyi,t) and std(¢logsalesi,t) see Tables 34, 35 and 36 in Appendix B.1.
12pirical results hold across various observable characteristics; on the other hand, we also show
that, quantitatively, using data sets that overrepresent large or publicly traded ﬁrms or are lim-
ited to manufacturing, as is the case with most U.S. data sets, one may overstate the cyclical
ﬂuctuations in ﬁrm-level uncertainty.
Table 7: RESULTS BY SECTOR
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y Sect.) ¹(¢)
std(¢log²i,t)Aggregate 2.67% -0.481 - 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)AGR 4.44% -0.045 -0.283 0.173
std(¢log²i,t)MIN/ENE 11.46% -0.166 0.107 0.116
std(¢log²i,t)MAN 3.54% -0.607 -0.397 0.115
std(¢log²i,t)CON 4.56% -0.483 0.037 0.112
std(¢log²i,t)TRD 2.68% -0.192 -0.387 0.124
std(¢log²i,t)TRA/COM 3.28% -0.036 0.034 0.136
Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3. AGR: Agriculture; MIN/ENE: Mining & Energy; MAN: Manufacturing; CON:
Construction ; TRD: Trade (Retail & Wholesale); TRA/COM: Transportation & Communication. Y refers to the
outputoftheaggregateofthenon-ﬁnancialprivatebusinesssector. Y Sect. referstotheoutputofthecorresponding
sector.
Table7displaysthebehaviorofproductivityriskforthesixsingle-digitsectorsintheUSTAN
sample. The relatively large idiosyncratic risk is obviously not speciﬁc to any sector, in fact the
numbers are surprisingly uniform across sectors. When one disregards the small agricultural
sector, average productivity uncertainty ranges from 11.2% in the construction sector to 13.6%
in the transportation and communication sector. For the two sectors that comprise almost 90%
ofallﬁrm-yearobservationsinthedata–manufacturingandtrade–alsothecountercyclicality-
of-uncertainty result is robust.16 Finally, also the result that risk ﬂuctuations are not large is
robust across sectors (again with the exception of the small mining and energy sector). Manu-
facturing and construction exhibit somewhat larger risk ﬂuctuations, but the difference to both
the trade sector and the aggregate is small.
The non-random design of USTAN manifests itself not only in the sectoral but also the size
composition of the sample. To understand the effect of this, we split the sample according to
ﬁrm size, as measured by employment. Again this yields no different results. Table 8 shows
that large ﬁrms exhibit a somewhat smaller average uncertainty that ﬂuctuates more than the
uncertainty of small ﬁrms, but overall the results are surprisingly uniform across size classes.17
16Had we used Log-diff-Y as the cyclical measure for the trade sector, the countercyclicality indicator would be
-0.474, and -0.455 in the case of Log-diff-Solow Residual. Moreover, the acyclicality of uncertainty in the construc-
tion sector, when the own sectoral output is used, goes away, when instead we use the average sectoral Solow
residual innovation from USTAN as the cyclical indicator: -0.059, 0.291, -0.638, -0.596, -0.270 and -0.290, respec-
13Table 8: RESULTS BY FIRM SIZE (EMPLOYMENT)
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
std(¢log²i,t)Aggregate 2.67% -0.481 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)First Quartile 1.75% -0.334 0.142
std(¢log²i,t)Second Quartile 3.21% -0.483 0.119
std(¢log²i,t)Third Quartile 3.13% -0.414 0.112
std(¢log²i,t)Fourth Quartile 4.49% -0.502 0.104
std(¢log²i,t)Largest 5% 5.55% -0.508 0.098
Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3. First Quartile refers to the smallest 25% ﬁrms in a given year, Second Quartile to
the ﬁrms with size in the 25%-50% range, etc., if size is measured in employment.
Nevertheless, it shows that using data sets, which suffer from an even stronger overrepre-
sentation of large ﬁrms, such as Compustat, may lead to an overstatement of the cyclical ﬂuc-
tuations in ﬁrm-level uncertainty. A similar point is made in Table 9, where we split the sample
according to a broad deﬁnition of legal form. Again, the publicly traded ﬁrms, which are also
typically large, are slightly different from the aggregate.
Table 9: RESULTS BY LEGAL FORM
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
¾(¢log²i,t)Aggregate 2.67% -0.481 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)Publicly Traded 4.01% -0.248 0.106
std(¢log²i,t)Limited Liability 3.02% -0.520 0.121
std(¢log²i,t)Unlimited Liability 2.66% -0.395 0.121





So far we have focused on permanent misrepresentation of certain kinds of ﬁrms, like a bias
towards manufacturing. As we have shown, this can be dealt with by splitting the sample along
observable characteristics. The possibility of systematic cyclical variation in sample selection,
for instance through ﬁrm entry and exit, poses a more severe problem to our analysis.
tively, for the six sectors.
17We tried alternative splits according to the stock of capital and real value added. The results are very similar,
details can be found in Table 35 in Appendix B.1. Numbers for the dispersions of innovations to ﬁrm-level value
added and sales across size classes are available on request. We also studied a stratiﬁcation according to ﬁrm-level
productivity and found the same results. Again, details are available on request.
14We address the issue of cyclical sample selection in two different ways: in a ﬁrst pass, we
constrain our sample to those ﬁrms which we observe at least 20 times in the sample; secondly,
weestimateasimpleselectionmodel, wherelaggedﬁrm-levelSolowresidualsdetermineselec-
tion and ﬁrm-level Solow residual innovations are modeled as a mean regression.
Table 10: RESULTS FOR FIRMS WITH AT LEAST 20 OBSERVATIONS
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
std(¢log²i,t)Aggregate 2.67% -0.481 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)Longer in sample 4.61% -0.341 0.106
std(¢logyi,t)Aggregate 3.73% -0.451 0.142
std(¢logyi,t)Longer in sample 7.00% -0.383 0.120
std(¢logsalesi,t)Aggregate 3.82% -0.405 0.187
std(¢logsalesi,t)Longer in sample 7.90% -0.466 0.149
Notes: SeenotestoTables2and3. Thenumberoftotalﬁrm-yearobservationsgoesdownfrom854,105to212,607.
When we constrain our sample to those ﬁrms which we observe at least 20 times (see Ta-
ble 10), we ﬁnd the same countercyclical pattern in productivity risk as in the baseline sam-
pling with a higher volatility of uncertainty. The advantage of this sample is that its selection
is by construction less subject to cyclical ﬂuctuations. Its disadvantage is that the non-cyclical
selection bias becomes stronger and the sample covers more large, publicly traded ﬁrms. This
partly drives our ﬁnding, as the second procedure below shows.
Alternatively, we control for sample selection in the following way: we estimate a simple
selection model, where lagged ﬁrm-level Solow residuals determine selection. Productivity lev-
els are a natural determinant of market entry and exit. Firm-level Solow residual innovations
are modeled as a mean regression. Lagged ﬁrm speciﬁc Solow residuals are excluded from
this mean regression as productivity is highly persistent and thus lagged levels do not predict
changes. We use the maximum likelihood estimator by Heckman (1976) to infer the selection-
correctedstandarddeviationoftheresidualinthereduced-formregressionforﬁrm-levelSolow
residual innovations. The correlation between the latter and the sample standard deviation of
ﬁrm-level Solow residual innovations is 0.972, indicating that our results are not inﬂuenced by
systematic sample selection. Table 11 shows that this indeed is the case.
Table 11: CROSS-SECTIONAL DISPERSION - SELECTION-CORRECTED
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
std(¢log²i,t)Aggregate 2.67% -0.481 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)Selection-Corrected 2.63% -0.439 0.118
Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3.
15On the basis of these two pieces of evidence – robustness of our results to a sample with
surviving ﬁrms and a high correlation between selection-corrected and sample standard devia-
tions of ﬁrm-level Solow residual innovations – we conclude that cyclical sample attrition is not
central to our ﬁndings.18
Measurement Error
In any Solow residual calculation that is based on a simple Cobb-Douglas production func-
tionwithonlylaborandcapital,thereisthepotentialproblemofattributingoptimalchangesin
utilization,hoursperworkerorefforttorandomproductivitychangesandthereforeofoverstat-
ing (average) ﬁrm-level risk. Therefore we focus in Table 12 on those ﬁrms who did not change
the intensity of their material usage between two periods, assuming that observed changes in
material usage are a good proxy for unobserved changes in utilization (see Basu, 1996, for this
idea). These ﬁrms indeed exhibit a somewhat smaller productivity risk that ﬂuctuates slightly
more in relative terms than the productivity risk of the average ﬁrm in the sample. The mea-
sured countercyclicality of idiosyncratic uncertainty is smaller,19 but overall our results carry
over to this group of ﬁrms.
Table 12: RESULTS BY MATERIAL USAGE
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
std(¢log²i,t)Aggregate 2.67% -0.481 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)Material Intensity const. 4.19% -0.247 0.103
Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3. Material Intensity const. refers to ﬁrms whose material expenditures over
sales
mi,t
salesi,t have changed by less then one percentage point in absolute terms. Results for std(¢logyi,t) and
std(¢logsalesi,t) can be found in tables 37 in Appendix B.1.
More generally, we take measurement error at the micro level into account in the follow-
ing way: Assuming additive classical measurement error in ﬁrm-level log-Solow residuals and
log-valueaddedandatime-invariantmeasurementerrorvarianceinboth,wecanusethetime-
average of the difference between the one-period innovation to observed ﬁrm-level log-Solow
residuals/log-value added and half the variance of the two-period innovations to estimate the
variances of measurement error for both quantities. Subtracting this number (twice) from the
observedvarianceofone-periodinnovationsyieldsanestimateofthetruevarianceoftheinno-
18We also investigated whether the time-average and the cyclical behavior of ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects is large
enoughtoindicatesystematiccyclicalsampleselectionasaproblem. Wedidnotﬁndthatitis. Detailsareavailable
on request.
19The decline happens, irrespective of the cyclical measure used, but its magnitude is somewhat sensitive to the
choice of the cyclical measure. For instance, had we used Log-diff-Y, the decline would have been from -0.583 to
-0.460, and from -0.465 to -0.393 in the case of Log-diff-Solow Residual.
16vations. In other words, we obtain the variance of the measurement error from a permanent-
transitory decomposition of changes in productivity. This means, we attribute all temporary
changes in ﬁrm-level log-Solow residuals/log-value added to measurement error. For this rea-
son one should view the obtained numbers as upper bounds. Table 13 shows that the cycli-
cality measure for ﬁrm-level uncertainty is basically unaffected, but that its ﬂuctuations might
be somewhat underestimated when measurement error is not taking into account. Conversely,
the last column of Table 13 shows that part of the observed cross-sectional dispersion in inno-
vations to both ﬁrm-level Solow residuals and value added might be measurement error. Nev-
ertheless, even when measurement error is taking into account, idiosyncratic uncertainty is
signiﬁcantly larger than aggregate volatility.
Table 13: RESULTS AND MEASUREMENT ERROR
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
std(¢log²i,t)Aggregate 2.67% -0.481 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)Corrected 4.72% -0.472 0.091
std(¢logyi,t)Aggregate 3.73% -0.451 0.142
std(¢logyi,t)Corrected 4.63% -0.448 0.127
Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3. Corrected refers to the standard deviation corrected for measurement error,
as explained in the main text.
2.4 External Validation
In this section we use an additional data set to conﬁrm the countercyclicality of ﬁrm-level un-
certainty. Speciﬁcally,wemakeuseofsurveyevidenceonﬁrms’sgeneralsix-month-aheadbusi-
ness outlook from the IFO institute in Germany to validate our ﬁndings from the USTAN data
set. One of the items in this monthly business survey is: “Expectations for the next six months:
our business situation with respect to XY20 will, in a cyclical view, improve, remain about the
same, develop unfavorably.“. There is a widespread literature which argues that (qualitative)
survey disagreement is a good proxy for true ﬁrm-level uncertainty, see, for instance and for
an overview, Fuss and Vermeulen (2004). We make use of this idea and compute a ﬁrm-level
uncertainty index as follows, where pÅ
t denotes the fraction of ﬁrms that see their business out-
look improve in a given month, and p¡








20The IFO survey is at the product category level, multiproduct ﬁrms can ﬁll out more than one questionnaire.
17If all responders think their business situation will improve, this index will be minimized at
zero, if they split in half about their business outlook, this index will be maximized at unity.
Two issues arise, when comparing the IFO evidence to the USTAN data. First, the IFO insti-
tute conducts this survey in four major sectors: manufacturing, construction, retail and whole-
sale. DuetolimiteddataavailabilityintheGermansystemofnationalaccountingwecombined
the latter two into one trade sector for the analysis of the USTAN data. However, as Table 24
in Appendix A.1 shows, roughly 60% of the USTAN observations in the trade sector are from
wholesale,whichiswhyweusetheIFOwholesaledatainourcomparisonwiththeUSTANtrade
sector. Secondly, the IFO data are available on a monthly basis – looking six months ahead –,
whereas the USTAN are annual. Thus, some time aggregation of the uncertainty index is nec-
essary. We use the simple year average of UncertaintyIFO
t as our baseline case.21 Table 14
displays our ﬁndings:22
Table 14: COMPARISON USTAN AND IFO





Notes: See notes to Tables 2 and 3.
It shows in the ﬁrst column the correlation between the dispersion of USTAN ﬁrm-level
Solow Residual innovations and the IFO uncertainty index, and the correlation between the
latter and the cyclical component of aggregate output in the second column. The correlation
between the two measures of ﬁrm-level uncertainty is remarkably high, in particular for the
manufacturing sector, which the majority of the ﬁrms in the IFO survey belong to.23 Given the
smaller numbers of ﬁrms in the construction and the trade sector, which is further complicated
by the imperfect match to the USTAN trade sector, a small decline in correlation there is not
surprising. And the second column shows again the very consistent countercyclicality of this
alternative ﬁrm-level uncertainty measure. These ﬁndings give us further conﬁdence in the
robustness of our ﬁndings in the USTAN data set.
21Weexperimentwithsemi-annualanddifferentlytimedaveragesaswellastheJuneuncertaintyindexofagiven
year. The results are robust
22Figure 14 in Appendix B.1 displays the appropriately normalized time series of the dispersion of ﬁrm-level
Solow residual innovations from USTAN and the IFO uncertainty index for the manufacturing, construction and
wholesale sectors. The comove remarkably well.
23AccordingtoIFOpersonnelthereare,onaverage,roughly3400ﬁrmsfrommanufacturing,1900fromretailand
wholesale and 1100 from construction participation in the survey every month.
18In Table 38 in Appendix B.1 we provide further robustness checks for our results. In all these
robustnesschecksweﬁndastronglycountercyclicalproductivityriskwithrelativelysmallcycli-
cal ﬂuctuations in this risk. Next, we explore the quantitative implications of our three ﬁndings:
large idiosyncratic uncertainty, countercyclical ﬂuctuations in and relatively low volatility of
this uncertainty, in a heterogeneous ﬁrm dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
ﬁxed cost of capital adjustment.
3 The Model
In this section we describe our model economy. We start with the ﬁrm’s problem, followed by
a brief description of the households and the deﬁnition of equilibrium. We conclude with a
sketch of the equilibrium computation. Our model follows closely Khan and Thomas (2008)
and Bachmann et al. (2008). Since there the model set up is discussed in detail, we will be
rather brief here.
The main departure from either papers is the introduction of a second exogenous aggregate
state. FollowingBloom(2009)weassumethatﬁrmstodayobservethestandarddeviationofthe
distribution of idiosyncratic productivity shocks tomorrow, ¾(²0). Following Khan and Thomas
(2008), weapproximatethisnowbivariateaggregatestateprocesswithadiscreteMarkovchain.
3.1 Firms
The economy consists of a unit mass of small ﬁrms. We do not model entry and exit decisions.
Thereisonecommodityintheeconomythatcanbeconsumedorinvested. Eachﬁrmproduces
this commodity, employing its pre-determined capital stock (k) and labor (n), according to the
following Cobb-Douglas decreasing-returns-to-scale production function (µ È 0, º È 0, µÅº Ç
1):
y Æ z²kµnº, (1)
where z and ² denote aggregate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc (idiosyncratic) technology, respectively.
The idiosyncratic technology process has autocorrelation ½I. It follows a Markov chain,
whose transition matrix depends on the aggregate state of its time-varying standard deviation,
¾(²0). In contrast, its support is independent of the aggregate state. To also capture observed
excess kurtosis in the idiosyncratic productivity shocks, we use a mixture of two Gaussian dis-
tributions in the Tauchen-approximation algorithm instead of the usual normal distribution.24
24Tauchen (1986). For details, see Section 4.
19Wedenotethetrendgrowthrateofaggregateproductivityby(1¡µ)(°¡1),sothataggregate y
andk growatrate°¡1alongthebalancedgrowthpath. Fromnowonweworkwithk and y (and
laterC) in efﬁciency units. The linearly detrended logarithm of aggregate productivity levels as
well as linearly detrended ¾(²) evolve according to a VAR(1) process, with normal innovations v











where ¯ ¾(²) denotes the steady state standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity inno-
vations.25
Productivity innovations at different aggregation levels are independent. Also, idiosyncratic
productivity shocks are independent across productive units. In contrast, we do not impose
any restrictions on ­ or %A 2R2£2.
Each period a ﬁrms draws from a time-invariant distribution, G, its current cost of capital
adjustment, » ¸ 0, which is denominated in units of labor. G is a uniform distribution on [0, ¯ »],
common to all ﬁrms. Draws are independent across ﬁrms and over time, and employment is
freely adjustable.
At the beginning of a period, a ﬁrm is characterized by its pre-determined capital stock, its
idiosyncratic productivity, and its capital adjustment cost. Given the aggregate state, it decides
its employment level, n, production and depreciation occurs, workers are paid, and investment
decisions are made. Then the period ends.
Upon investment, i, the ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost of !», where ! is the current real wage rate.
Capital depreciates at a rate ±. We can then summarize the evolution of the ﬁrm’s capital stock
(in efﬁciency units) between two consecutive periods, from k to k0, as follows:
Fixed cost paid °k0
i 6Æ0: !» (1¡±)k Åi
i Æ0: 0 (1¡±)k
Given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs, it is sufﬁcient to describe differences across





constitutes the current aggregate state and ¹ evolves according to the law
of motion ¹0 Æ¡(z,¾(²0),¹), which ﬁrms take as given.




, in order to avoid negativity of the standard deviation of idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks is – given its high steady state value and relatively low variability – an unnecessary pre-
caution that does not change the results. Simulation results are available upon request.
20Next we describe the dynamic programming problem of each ﬁrm. We will take two short-
cuts (details can be found in Khan and Thomas, 2008). First, we state the problem in terms of
utilsoftherepresentativehousehold(ratherthanphysicalunits),anddenotebyp Æ p(z,¾(²0),¹)
the marginal utility of consumption. Second, given the i.i.d. nature of the adjustment costs,
continuation values can be expressed without explicitly taking into account future adjustment
costs.
Let V 1(²,k,»;z,¾(²0),¹) denote the expected discounted value—in utils—of a ﬁrm that is in
idiosyncratic state (²,k,»), given the aggregate state (z,¾(²0),¹). Then the expected value prior











and does not adjust, and Vadj the continuation value, net of adjustment costs AC, if the ﬁrm
adjusts its capital stock. That is:
CFÆ[z²kµnº¡!(z,¾(²0),¹)n]p(z,¾(²0),¹), (5a)
Vno adj Æ¯E[V 0(²0,(1¡±)k/°;z0,¾(²00),¹0)], (5b)
AC Æ»!(z,¾(²0),¹)p(z,¾(²0),¹), (5c)
Vadj Æ¡ip(z,¾(²0),¹)Å¯E[V 0(²0,k0;z0,¾(²00),¹0)], (5d)
where both expectation operators average over next period’s realizations of the aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks, conditional on this period’s values, and we recall that i Æ °k0 ¡(1¡±)k.
Also, ¯ denotes the discount factor of the representative household.
Taking as given !(z,¾(²0),¹) and p(z,¾(²0),¹), and the law of motion ¹0 Æ ¡(z,¾(²0),¹), the
ﬁrm chooses optimally labor demand, whether to adjust its capital stock at the end of the pe-
riod, and the optimal capital stock, conditional on adjustment. This leads to policy functions:
N Æ N(²,k;z,¾(²0),¹) and K Æ K(²,k,»;z,¾(²0),¹). Since capital is pre-determined, the optimal
employment decision is independent of the current adjustment cost draw.
213.2 Households
We assume a continuum of identical households that have access to a complete set of state-
contingent claims. Hence, there is no heterogeneity across households. Moreover, they own
shares in the ﬁrms and are paid dividends. We do not need to model the household side in
detail (see Khan and Thomas (2008) for the details), and concentrate instead on the ﬁrst-order
conditions to determine the equilibrium wage and the marginal utility of consumption.
Households have a standard felicity function in consumption and (indivisible) labor:
U(C,Nh)ÆlogC ¡ ANh, (6)
whereC denotesconsumptionand Nh thehousehold’slaborsupply. Householdsmaximizethe




















1. Firm optimality: Taking !, p and ¡ as given, V 1(²,k;z,¾(²0),¹) solves (4) and the corre-
sponding policy functions are N(²,k;z,¾(²0),¹) and K(²,k,»;z,¾(²0),¹).
2. Household optimality: Taking ! and p as given, the household’s consumption and labor
supply satisfy (7) and (8).
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[°K(²,k,»;z,¾(²0),¹)¡(1¡±)k]dGd¹.











where J(x)Æ0, if x Æ0 and 1, otherwise.
5. Modelconsistentdynamics: Theevolutionofthecross-sectionthatcharacterizestheecon-
omy, ¹0 Æ ¡(z,¾(²0),¹), is induced by K(²,k,»;z,¾(²0),¹) and the exogenous processes for
z, ¾(²0) as well as ².
Conditions1, 2, 3and4deﬁneanequilibriumgiven¡, whilestep5speciﬁestheequilibrium
condition for ¡.
3.4 Solution
As is well-known, (4) is not computable, since ¹ is inﬁnite dimensional. Hence, we follow
Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) and approximate the distribution ¹ by its ﬁrst moment over
capital, and its evolution, ¡, by a simple log-linear rule. In the same vein, we approximate the
equilibrium pricing function by a log-linear rule discrete – aggregate state by discrete aggregate
state:

















log ¯ k, (9b)
where ¯ k denotesaggregatecapitalholdings. Given (8),wedonothavetospecifyanequilibrium
rulefortherealwage. Asusualwiththisprocedure,wepositthisformandcheckthatinequilib-
rium it yields a good ﬁt to the actual law of motion. We use this simple forecasting rule because
it is much less computationally involved than a rule that includes higher moments of the capi-
tal distribution. In models without second moment shocks, it has been extensively shown that
the ﬁrst moment sufﬁces. Unfortunately, we show here that the pure R2 goodness-of-ﬁt metric
does not favor the simple rule (9a): R2 below 0.9 are possible, as we shall see in Section 5.2.
However, we show for our baseline calibration that the aggregate dynamics of the economy are
hardly affected, when higher moments of the capital distribution are included and the R2 are
pushed closer to unity (see Bachmann et al. (2008) for a similar observation). Therefore, we
prefer the increase in computational speed and report our results, unless otherwise noted, with
the ﬁrst moment only as a state variable.
23Combining these assumptions and substituting ¯ k for ¹ into (4) and using (9a)–(9b), we
have that (4) becomes a computable dynamic programming problem with policy functions
N Æ N(²,k;z,¾(²0), ¯ k) and K Æ K(²,k,»;z,¾(²0), ¯ k). We solve this problem via value function
iteration on V 0.
With these policy functions, we can then simulate a model economy without imposing the
equilibrium pricing rule (9b), but rather solve for it along the way. We simulate the model
economy for 1,600 time periods and discard the ﬁrst 100 observations, when computing any
statistics. This procedure generates a time series of {pt} and {¯ kt} endogenously, with which as-
sumed rules (9a)–(9b) can be updated via a simple OLS regression. The procedure stops when

















sufﬁciently close to the previous ones. We skip the details of this procedure, as this has been
outlined elsewhere – see Khan and Thomas (2008) and Bachmann et al. (2008).
4 Calibration
4.1 Baseline
The model period is a year – in congruence with the data frequency in USTAN. The following
parameters have standard values: ¯ Æ 0.98 and ± Æ 0.094, which we compute from German
national accounting data for the sectoral aggregate that the USTAN sample corresponds to: the
non-ﬁnancialprivatebusinesssector. Giventhisdepreciationrate,wepick°Æ1.014,inorderto
matchthetime-averageaggregateinvestmentrate of0.108. Thisnumberis alsoconsistentwith
German long-run growth rates. The log-felicity function features an elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (EIS) of one. The disutility of work parameter, A, is chosen to generate an average
time spent at work of 0.33: A Æ2 for the baseline calibration.
We set the output elasticities of labor and capital to º Æ 0.5565 and µ Æ 0.2075, respectively,
which correspond to the measured median labor and capital shares in manufacturing in the
USTAN data base (see Appendix A.4). While our data also include a considerable amount of
ﬁrms from other sectors, any weighted average or median of these shares would still be close to
the manufacturing values, which is why we decided to use them in our baseline calibration.26
Next, we have to choose the parameters of the two-state aggregate shock process. Here we
simply estimate a bivariate, unrestricted VAR with the linearly detrended natural logarithm of
26If one views the DRTS assumption as a mere stand-in for a CRTS production function with monopolistic com-
petition, than these choices would correspond to an employment elasticity of the underlying production function
of 0.7284 and a markup of 1
µÅº Æ1.31. Given the regulated product markets in Germany, this is a reasonable value.
The implied capital elasticity of the revenue function, µ
1¡º is 0.47. We have experimented with both elasticities
quite a bit, but have not found any of our main results depending on them. Details are available on request.
24the aggregate Solow residual27 and the linearly detrended ¾(²)-process from the USTAN data.28












When measurement error in ﬁrm-level Solow residuals is taken into account, as speciﬁed in












This process is discretized on a [5£5]¡grid, using a bivariate analog of Tauchen’s proce-
dure. We measure the steady state standard deviation of idiosyncratic technology innovations
as ¯ ¾(²) Æ 0.1201. Since these innovations also exhibit mild excess kurtosis – 4.4480 on average
over our time horizon –,30 and since the adjustment cost parameter ¯ » will be identiﬁed by the
kurtosis of the ﬁrm-level investment rate (next to its skewness), we want to avoid attributing
excess kurtosis in the ﬁrm-level investment rate to nonlinearities in the adjustment technology,
when the driving force itself has kurtosis. Hence, we incorporate the measured excess kurtosis
into the discretization process for the idiosyncratic technology state.31 Finally, we set ½I Æ0.95,
in accordance with the high persistence of Solow residual innovations in the data. This process






the adjustment costs parameter ¯ » to minimize a quadratic form in the normalized differences
between the time-average ﬁrm-level investment rate skewness produced by the model and the
data, as well as the time-average ﬁrm-level investment rate kurtosis:32
27We use again ºÆ0.5565 and µ Æ0.2075 in these calculations.
28After ﬁrm-level and sectoral ﬁxed effects have been removed.
29Withaslightabuseofnotation, butforthesakeofreadability, ­displaysstandarddeviationsonthemaindiag-
onal and correlations on the off diagonal. We also estimate a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) speciﬁcation
of this bivariate VAR and use it for simulation. This speciﬁcation mitigates somewhat the obvious problems with
estimating a bivariate VAR with 7 independent parameters from 2£26 data points. We show that both the actual
estimates of the remaining VAR parameters as well as the implications for our simulation results are remarkably
robust. Results can be seen in Table 40 in Appendix B.2.
30We ﬁnd no skewness.
31We achieve this by using a mixture of two Gaussian distributions: N(0,0.0777) and N(0,0.1625) – the standard
deviations are 0.1201§0.0424 – with a weight of 0.4118 on the ﬁrst distribution.
32The normalization constants in (12) are, respectively, the time series standard deviation of the investment rate




























As can be seen from (12), the distribution of ﬁrm-level investment rates exhibits both sub-
stantial positive skewness – 2.1920 – as well as kurtosis – 20.0355. Caballero et al. (1995) doc-
ument a similar fact for U.S. manufacturing plants. They also argue that non-convex capital
adjustmentcostsareanimportantingredienttoexplainsuchastronglynon-Gaussiandistribu-
tion, given a close-to-Gaussian shock process. We therefore use the deviation from Gaussianity
in ﬁrm-level investment rates to identify ¯ ».
The following Table 15 demonstrates identiﬁcation of ¯ », as cross-sectional skewness and
kurtosis of the ﬁrm-level investment rates are both monotonically increasing in ¯ ». The mini-
mum of the distance measure ª is achieved for ¯ » Æ 0.3, our baseline case.33 This implies costs
conditional on adjustment equivalent to 15.4% of annual ﬁrm-level output on average, which
is well in line with estimates from the U.S. (see Bloom, 2009). With measurement error in ²i,t,
¯ »Æ0.25.
Table 15: CALIBRATION OF ADJUSTMENT COSTS - ¯ »
¯ » Skewness Kurtosis ª(¯ ») Adj. costs/
Unit of Output
0.01 0.7852 5.0389 11.5082 1.5%
0.05 1.5168 7.6444 6.0062 4.2%
0.1 1.9340 9.3327 3.9157 6.8%
0.2 2.4011 11.4056 2.547 11.3%
0.3 (BL) 2.6915 12.8042 2.2402 15.4%
0.5 3.0686 14.7669 2.5035 23.3%
1 3.5926 17.8112 4.2169 43.3%
4.2 Variants of the Driving Processes
The empirical analysis has shown a negative comovement between the dispersion of ﬁrm-level
Solow residual innovations and aggregate Solow residuals. The dynamics of this comovement –
asin(2)and(10)–implythatonevariableconveysinformationaboutthefuturedevelopmentof
33We searched over a ﬁner grid of ¯ » than displayed in the table, in order to ﬁnd the optimal ¯ ».
26theother. Inotherwords,ashocktoidiosyncraticuncertaintyaffectsaggregateactivitynotonly
throughtheoptionvaluechannelshighlightedbyBloom(2009)andBloometal. (2009),butalso
as a news shock in the spirit of Beaudry and Portier (2006), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008), Sims
(2008) as well as Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2008). Upon observing an increase in idiosyncratic
uncertainty today, households and ﬁrms rationally expect a future decrease in productivity ce-
teris paribus.
To disentangle the effects from the news about productivity contained in movements in
idiosyncratic uncertainty, we solve a variant of our model where the actual risk that ﬁrms face
remains constant over time at ¯ ¾(²) Æ 0.1201, but ﬁrms still observe a time-varying state, s, as a
variable without further economic content that nonetheless contains information about future
productivity as in (2). The parameters that describe the law of motion of s are the same as
in (2) and (10), i.e. as in the model with time-varying uncertainty. More generally, we can re-







For # Æ 0, idiosyncratic uncertainty remains constant and in the following we use the term
‘News Model’ to describe this parametrization. The second state no longer inﬂuences actual
risk, but only the conditional expectation of future aggregate Solow residuals, z0. The baseline
speciﬁcation in which idiosyncratic uncertainty ﬂuctuates as well is termed ‘Full Model’, #Æ1.
Using an # È 1 we can scale up the ﬂuctuations in idiosyncratic uncertainty without changing
the underlying dynamics of the exogenous state variables, i.e. keeping the news content of s
constant. Moreover, for comparison we consider a model with a standard univariate AR(1) pro-
cess for the aggregate Solow residual, ‘RBC Model’, and a speciﬁcation, where the only driving
force of business cycles are shocks to idiosyncratic uncertainty, ‘Risk Model’.34
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Results
Our main set of quantitative results can be summarized as follows: 1) Fluctuations in idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty alone do not produce business cycle dynamics as observed in the data. 2)
Adding orthogonal shocks to idiosyncratic uncertainty into a model with ﬁrst-moment shocks
to aggregate Solow residuals hardly changes the business cycle dynamics of the model. 3)
Adding shocks to idiosyncratic uncertainty that comove with aggregate Solow residuals in a
34 The estimated autocorrelation of the aggregate Solow residual is 0.5259 and the standard deviation of its inno-
vations 0.0182. The corresponding moments for the univariate risk process are: 0.5685 and 0.0028.
27way observed in the data produces mild changes in the business cycle dynamics of the model,
which we attribute to the bad news effect that uncertainty shocks have for aggregate produc-
tivity in the future. This bad news effect is embodied in the negative VAR coefﬁcient (see 10) of
tomorrow’s (but known today) ﬁrm-level uncertainty on tomorrow’s aggregate Solow residual.
Risk Model
Table 16: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE PURE ‘RISK MODEL’
Moment/Aggregate Quantity Y C I N
Baseline
Volatility 0.30% (2.30%) 0.23% (1.79%) 2.01% (4.37%) 0.41% (1.80%)
Volatility relative to Y 1 0.77 (0.78) 6.76 (1.90) 1.38 (0.78)
Persistence 0.55 (0.48) 0.51 (0.67) 0.29 (0.42) 0.26 (0.61)
Correlation with Y 1 0.02 (0.66) 0.84 (0.83) 0.79 (0.68)
Correlation withC 0.02 (0.66) 1 -0.52 (0.60) -0.60 (0.36)
Measurement error in ²i,t
Volatility 0.35% (2.30%) 0.27% (1.79%) 2.51% (4.37%) 0.51% (1.80%)
Volatility relative to Y 1 0.77 (0.78) 7.23 (1.90) 1.47 (0.78)
Persistence 0.49 (0.48) 0.44 (0.67) 0.24 (0.42) 0.22 (0.61)
Correlation with Y 1 -0.124 (0.66) 0.86 (0.83) 0.82 (0.68)
Correlation withC -0.124 (0.66) 1 -0.61(0.60) -0.67 (0.36)
Notes:
Business cycle statistics of aggregate output, Y , consumptionC, investment I and employment N. N in the model
includes the amount of labor used to adjust the ﬁrms’ capital stocks. All variables are logged and then HP-ﬁltered
with a smoothing parameter of 100. The ﬁrst numbers in a column refer to a simulation of the model over T Æ
1500 periods. Numbers in brackets refer to German aggregate NFPBS data (see Appendix A.1, Footnote 49, for a
detailed description of sources). Volatility is percentage standard deviation. Persistence refers to the ﬁrst order
autocorrelation.
Table 16 shows that the pure ‘Risk Model’, in which the only driving force of business cycles
is ﬂuctuations in uncertainty, yields little ﬂuctuations. Output ﬂuctuations are almost eight
times smaller than in the data, investment ﬂuctuations just below 50% of the volatility in the
data. The uncertainty ﬂuctuations in the data are simply too small – with a time series coef-
ﬁcient of variation of 2.67% – to generate realistic business ﬂuctuations. This ﬁnding is only
mildly changed, when measurement error in ﬁrm-level Solow residuals is taken into account
as described in Section 2.3. Even though the coefﬁcient of variation of uncertainty ﬂuctuations
now increases by roughly three quarters to 4.72%, aggregate ﬂuctuations become only some-
what stronger. We also note that general equilibrium price movements are partly responsible
for this low volatility, as the volatility of output, investment and employment increases, respec-
28tively, to 0.63%, 4.28% and 0.63%, i.e. more than doubles in a simulation, where we ﬁx real
wages and real interest rates to their average value from the general equilibrium simulation.35
This shows that general equilibrium is important for understanding the aggregate implications
of idiosyncratic uncertainty innovations and that previous work in partial equilibrium might
have neglected an important channel. Finally, in terms of contemporaneous correlations with
output, pure uncertainty shocks lead to a counterfactual de-coupling of consumption and out-
put,whichisaccompaniedbynegativecorrelationsbetweenconsumptionontheonehandand
investment and employment on the other. We conclude that uncertainty shocks alone cannot
produce business cycles in an ﬂexible price and market clearing model, augmented with per-
sistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks and ﬁxed capital adjustment costs.
We also experimented with mechanically and counterfactually doubling and quadrupling
the uncertainty ﬂuctuations, (#Æ2 and #Æ4), and found that this leads to an almost linear in-
crease in all volatilities of the pure ‘Risk Model’, whereas persistence and correlations with out-
put and consumption are practically unchanged.36 This is a perhaps surprising ﬁnding: just as
with ﬁrst moment shocks, increasing the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks essentially amounts
to re-scaling the model generated ﬂuctuations. Consequently, we would need to observe un-
certainty ﬂuctuations that are roughly eight times as large as the ﬂuctuations we observe in
the data, in order for ﬂuctuations in idiosyncratic uncertainty alone to produce realistic output
volatility. This number would then be close to the volatility of uncertainty that based on stock
market data has been suggested by Bloom (2009) for the U.S.: roughly 17%. However, it is un-
likely that we underestimate the risk ﬂuctuations by such an order of magnitude. In fact, as we
have shown, the volatility of ﬁrm-level uncertainty only increases by a factor of 1.75 when mea-
surement error is accounted for. Moreover, none of our different sample splits or robustness
checksﬁndanincreaseinthevolatilityofuncertaintybymorethanafactoroftworelativetothe
baseline speciﬁcation. To the contrary, as Table 7 in Section 2.3 shows, the service sector – still
underrepresented in the USTAN data – exhibits less volatile uncertainty ﬂuctuations than the
goods-producing industries. Thus we should expect to have over- rather than underestimated
the volatility of uncertainty ﬂuctuations for the overall economy, especially if we extrapolate to
other countries like the U.S., where it is well-known that the tertiary sectors comprise a much
larger share of aggregate output and employment in the U.S., compared to Germany.
Risk Model and RBC Model
Although we do not ﬁnd realistic business cycles caused by uncertainty ﬂuctuations alone,
they might well alter more standard ﬁrst-moment-driven cycles. Therefore, as a next step, we
brieﬂy compare the ‘Risk Model’ with the simple ‘RBC Model’,37 and include a speciﬁcation,
35These numbers are not reported in a table. Details for the partial equilibrium case are available on request.
36This holds for both speciﬁcations, i.e. with and without measurement error. Details are available on request.
37We keep the calibrated adjustment costs ﬁxed across the variants for the driving process. This is justiﬁed, since
29Table 17: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE PURE ‘RISK MODEL’ AND THE ‘RBC
MODEL’
RBC-Risk RBC Risk
Combination Model Model Data
Volatility
of Output 3.18% 3.17% 0.30% 2.30%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.45 0.38 0.77 0.78
Investment 4.27 4.36 6.76 1.90
Employment 0.69 0.70 1.38 0.78
Persistence
Output 0.32 0.31 0.55 0.48
Consumption 0.64 0.54 0.51 0.67
Investment 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.42
Employment 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.61
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.81 0.86 0.02 0.66
Investment 0.95 0.97 0.84 0.83
Employment 0.92 0.96 0.79 0.68
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Comsumption
Investment 0.60 0.73 -0.52 0.60
Employment 0.53 0.69 -0.60 0.36
Notes: See notes to Table 16. ‘RBC-Risk Combination’ refers to a simulation, where we simply combine the two
univariate processes for aggregate Solow residuals and idiosyncratic uncertainty, as speciﬁed in Footnote 34.
where we mechanically combine the two univariate processes for aggregate Solow residuals
and idiosyncratic uncertainty, as speciﬁed in Footnote 34. This variant is referred to as ‘RBC-
Risk Combination’. It gives a ﬁrst indication, whether second-moment shocks as found in ﬁrm-
level data can alter the aggregate dynamics of a standard ‘RBC Model’. Table 17 shows that this
is–withonesmallexception–notthecase: the‘RBCModel’displayssecond-momentstatistics
very similar to the combined one: ‘RBC-Risk Combination’. Not even the notoriously too high
contemporaneous output correlations are signiﬁcantly mitigated by this second, independent
shock. Put differently, the characteristic features of the ‘Risk Model’ vanish as soon as uncer-
they were calibrated to the steady state investment rate distribution, which is at least numerically invariant to the
speciﬁcation of the driving process. That means, by the ‘RBC Model’ we really mean a model with ﬁxed capital
adjustment costs and shocks to aggregate Solow residuals only. De facto, however, the calibrated adjustment cost
level is so low that our baseline model is in the neutrality range explored by Khan and Thomas (2008).
30tainty shocks are combined with standard aggregate Solow residual innovations. Only the con-
temporaneous correlations between aggregate consumption on the one hand and aggregate
investment and employment on the other are pushed downward, closer to the data.
Perhaps surprisingly, the overall volatility of the ‘RBC Model’ is too high, relative to the data.
In Table 20 in Section 5.2 we show that ﬁxing the excess volatility of the model by re-scaling the
volatility of the ﬁrst-moment shock – to give the second moment shock maximum chance – so
as to match the observed volatility of aggregate output does not change our main results.
Otherwise, the ‘RBC Model’ displays the well-known and typical failures: low persistence,
too high contemporaneous correlations with output and the wrong mix between relative con-
sumption and investment volatility, the former being too low, the latter too high. What matters
here that neither the ‘Risk Model’ alone nor, as we shall see, in combination with ﬁrst-moment
shocks ﬁxes these failures in a satisfying manner. Of course, there are well-known additions to
the ‘RBC Model’, such as quadratic adjustment costs for capital on top of the ﬁxed ones, or sim-
ply higher ﬁxed adjustment costs, that would help to ameliorate its performance, but we aim
here for cleanliness of exposition and view these issues as mainly orthogonal to the question,
whether shocks to idiosyncratic uncertainty matter for aggregate dynamics.
Full Model and News Model
Integrating our empirical ﬁndings a bit further into the model simulations, we extend the
driving process (2) such that it incorporates the correlation structure between ﬁrm-level uncer-
tainty and aggregate Solow residuals found in the data. We proceed in three steps. First, we
introduce in the ‘RBC Model’ the aggregate driving process estimated in the data, (10), but set
# Æ 0, i.e. s has no actual implications for ﬁrm-level uncertainty. Also, we allow ﬁrms’ policy
functions to depend only on aggregate productivity z. We call this speciﬁcation ‘Naive Model’,
because ﬁrms could actually use s to get better forecasts about aggregate productivity. Second,
we lift the latter assumption and allow ﬁrms to condition their optimal policy on s as well as z.
The state s still has no implications for ﬁrm-level uncertainty, it merely helps to forecast aggre-
gate productivity tomorrow. This variant – the aforementioned ‘News Model’ – adds the news
character of uncertainty ﬂuctuations to the model. Third, we explore the effect of uncertainty
ﬂuctuations, setting #Æ1. This speciﬁcation is called ‘Full Model’.
Comparing ‘Full Model’ and ‘RBC Model’, we ﬁnd that the standard business cycle statistics,
volatilities, autocorrelations and correlations, change only modestly, see Table 18. As for au-
tocorrelations, most of the change is mechanically due to the different driving process, as the
persistence improvements happen, even when agents do not use the news content of uncer-
tainty shocks (‘Naive Model’). The same holds partially true for the increase in the volatility of
aggregate output.38 In other words, the excess volatility in output, featured in the ‘RBC Model’,
38Of course, in general equilibrium this change is not purely mechanical, because the change in aggregate dy-
namics alters the Krusell-Smith rules, and therefore there is an indirect effect of news on agents’ decisions.
31Table 18: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE ‘FULL MODEL’ AND ‘NEWS MODEL’
Full News Naive RBC ME-Full ME-News
Model Model Model Model Data Model Model
Volatility
of Output 4.04% 4.24% 3.72% 3.17% 2.30% 3.95% 4.19%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.32 0.30 0.40 0.38 0.78 0.35 0.32
Investment 4.71 4.77 4.32 4.36 1.90 4.50 4.62
Employment 0.74 0.76 0.69 0.70 0.78 0.72 0.75
Persistence
Output 0.42 0.46 0.47 0.31 0.48 0.43 0.47
Consumption 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.54 0.67 0.67 0.66
Investment 0.34 0.41 0.42 0.26 0.42 0.35 0.42
Employment 0.33 0.40 0.42 0.25 0.61 0.33 0.42
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.66 0.87 0.87
Investment 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.83 0.98 0.98
Employment 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.68 0.97 0.98
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.73 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.60 0.76 0.78
Employment 0.69 0.72 0.66 0.69 0.36 0.72 0.75
Notes: See notes to Table 16. The ‘Naive Model’ is a simulation, where the realized aggregate shock process is
the same as in the ‘News Model’, but we allow agents only to condition their policy functions on aggregate Solow
residuals. ME designates the measurement error speciﬁcation from equation (11).
is actually exacerbated when introducing the further state s. However, not all differences are
mechanic to the driving process. We can see that agents using the information content of the
secondunderlyingstateleadstoalteredrelativevolatilities,whichismarkedbythechangefrom
the ‘Naive Model’ to the ‘News Model’. Yet only in the case of the relative volatility of employ-
ment, the ‘Full Model’ actually brings improvement over the ‘RBC Model’. However, the overall
change from the ‘RBC Model’ to the ‘Full Model’ is not due to the speciﬁc nature of the sec-
ond state being time-varying uncertainty and thus generating time-varying option values, but
ratherduetoitsnewscharacterforaggregateproductivity: changesinuncertaintyalterthecon-
ditional expectations of aggregate productivity. Hence, an increase in risk acts as a (bad) news
shock. This bad news is embodied in the negative VAR coefﬁcient of tomorrow’s (but known to-
32day) ﬁrm-level uncertainty on tomorrow’s aggregate Solow residual, see (10).39 Finally, the last
panel of Table 18 shows almost no changes in the contemporaneous correlations with output
and consumption. In particular, there is no decrease in the notoriously too high ‘RBC Model’
correlation coefﬁcients, something that one might have hoped for with the introduction of a
second aggregate shock. In summary, there is little difference between the ‘Full Model’ and
the ‘News Model’. This ﬁnding is robust to measurement error on the micro side, as the last two
columnsofTable18show. Figure2illustratesthisfurtherbysimplyplottingatimeseriestrajec-
tory of aggregate output simulations from both models for an identical bivariate shock series.
Both time series look very similar.
Figure 2: Comparison of the ‘Full Model’ and the‘News Model’

















Time Path of Aggregate Output − Measurement Error
Notes: Raw aggregate output from simulations of the ‘Full Model’ and the‘News Model’.
Uncertainty Shocks as News Shocks
To further understand the mechanisms behind the effect of shocks to idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty, we run a series of trivariate SVARs with one lag, where we augment the aggregate Solow
residual (ordered ﬁrst) and the idiosyncratic uncertainty (ordered second) by a third variable:
aggregate output, the aggregate investment rate, aggregate consumption, aggregate saving, ag-
39We also estimate a SUR speciﬁcation of this bivariate VAR and use it for simulation. We show that most of
the changes between the ‘RBC Model’ and the ‘Full/News Model’ are mainly due to the interaction effect between
aggregate Solow residuals and ﬁrm-level uncertainty. Results can be seen in Table 40 in Appendix B.2
33gregate employment and hours as well as the real wage.40 We estimate these SVARs both from
the actual data for 1973 - 1998 and for 60 independent T Æ 26-samples from simulations of
both ‘Full Model’ and ‘News Model’. With a series of impulse response functions, we show
ﬁrst that ‘Full Model’ and ‘News Model’ are practically indistinguishable in their conditional
responses to shocks to idiosyncratic uncertainty.41 Secondly, we also show that – for the most
part – model and data impulse responses look very much alike, i.e. our model replicates the
empirical aggregate dynamics resulting from a shock to uncertainty. Finally, these impulse re-
sponses are exactly like the impulse responses to a bad news shock in a standard RBC model
with King-Rebelo-Plosser preferences (see Beaudry and Portier, 2006, Jaimovich and Rebelo,
2008 and Sims, 2008): output and investment increase, consumption decreases. The intertem-
poral wealth effect increases labor supply and this depresses the real wage. As the ﬁgures below
show, all these ﬁndings are robust to measurement error in the ﬁrm-level Solow residual.
Figure 3: Impulse Response of Aggregate Output to a Shock in Idiosyncratic Uncertainty


























Notes: Impulse response functions from SVAR estimations of the linearly detrended aggregate Solow residual (or-
dered ﬁrst), the linearly detrended idiosyncratic uncertainty (ordered second) and HP(100)-ﬁltered aggregate out-
put (ordered third). The dotted lines reﬂect 95% conﬁdence bounds for the estimates from the data from 10,000
bootstrap replications. Estimates from data are in red, estimates from simulated data in blue (‘Full Model’) and
green (‘News Model’), respectively. Estimates from simulated data are the average of 60 impulse response func-
tions estimated on 60 independent time series of T Æ26, the length of our sample.
40We use a simple Cholesky decomposition, assuming the aggregate Solow residual has an instantaneous effect
on idiosyncratic uncertainty but not vice versa. This is to identify a pure innovation in contemporaneous uncer-
tainty. NoticethatstudyingSVARsinthiscontextisreallystudyingandcomparinganinterestingsummarystatistic
between data and models. There is nor claim on causal empirical identiﬁcation.
41The impulse responses with respect to an innovation to the aggregate Solow residual are available on request.
Except for the general excess volatility of our baseline calibration, data and model impulse responses are very
similar and theoretically reasonable. We take this as a good sign that our impulse responses with respect to a
second-moment shock are estimated reasonably well despite the short sample problems.
34Figure 3 displays the impulse response of aggregate output to a shock to idiosyncratic un-
certainty. On impact, output goes up after an increase in uncertainty (larger dispersion of ﬁrm-
level productivity innovations in the following period), both in the model and in the data. So,
ratherthancausinganimmediaterecession, ashasbeenarguedintheliteratureonuncertainty
shocks thus far, a shock in idiosyncratic uncertainty causes a boom in output on impact. Then
the bad news is realized and the economy goes into a recession.
Figure 4: Impulse Response of the Aggregate Investment Rate and Aggregate Consumption to a
Shock in Idiosyncratic Uncertainty
























































Notes: See notes to Figure 3. In this ﬁgure, the linearly detrended aggregate investment rate and HP(100)-ﬁltered
consumption, respectively, are ordered third. The aggregate investment rate is the sum of NFPBS investment di-
vided by the average of the beginning-of-period and end-of-period aggregate capital stocks in NFPBS.
The left-hand panel of Figure 4 shows a similar expansion in the model aggregate invest-
ment rate as a response to an uncertainty shock, which is at least qualitatively consistent with
the data, given the wide conﬁdence bands around the downward sloping point estimate.42 Of
course, the impulse response of aggregate investment features the excess volatility we have dis-
cussedabove. Incontrast,theright-handpanelofFigure4illustratesthattheoppositeistruefor
the undershooting impulse response of aggregate consumption, which declines after a shock
42An SVAR with aggregate investment instead of the aggregate investment rate shows a positive point estimate
with similarly wide conﬁdence bands.
35to idiosyncratic uncertainty, because agents anticipate through it lower aggregate productivity
and therefore wealth in the future. One can (re-)interpret the quote by Blanchard from the in-
troduction in this context: higher uncertainty leads to a fall in consumption through a wealth
effect, whichinturnshiftsthesupplyoffundscurveoutward, loweringtherealinterestrateand
thus causing an investment increase on impact (of course in the current situation the economy
has arguably been hit also by contemporaneous negative ﬁrst moment shocks, which is why we
would not necessarily observe this investment increase). Notice, however, that this is a very dif-
ferent mechanism from the wait-and-see interpretation of uncertainty increases that has been
proposed in the literature and that operates through time-varying real option values.
Figure 5: Impulse Response of National Saving to a Shock in Idiosyncratic Uncertainty




























Notes: See notes to Figure 3. In this ﬁgure, HP(100)-ﬁltered saving is ordered third.
Figure 5 shows this increase of saving in the model as well as the data response. Of course,
Germany is an open economy, and, thus, the impulse response of saving is really the correct
data counterpart of the impulse response of saving/investment in the model. An open econ-
omy means that aggregate investment can be ﬁnanced from abroad and that the transmission
of the wealth effect onto investment is mitigated. The open economy response of aggregate in-
vestment is therefore closer to the negative partial equilibrium response that we show below in
Figure 8.
36Figure 6: Impulse Response of the Aggregate Employment and Aggregate Hours to a Shock in
Idiosyncratic Uncertainty




















































Notes: See notes to Figure 3. In this ﬁgure, HP(100)-ﬁltered aggregate employment and HP(100)-ﬁltered aggregate
total hours, respectively, are ordered third. Employment in the model includes the amount of labor used to adjust
the ﬁrms’ capital stocks.
Figure 7: Impulse Response of the Real Wage to a Shock in Idiosyncratic Uncertainty






























Notes: SeenotestoFigure3. Inthisﬁgure,theHP(100)-ﬁlteredrealwageisorderedthird. Therealwageisaggregate
real payroll divided by the number of workers.
Consistent with the wealth effect both the data and the model impulse responses display an
increase in aggregate employment, whether it is measured in the data by number of workers or
aggregate hours (since the model features indivisible labor, this distinction is meaningless for
37the model). This increase in aggregate labor inputs – and the output boom that is entailed – is
made possible by a decline in the real wage. The labor market response, which is typical for a
bad news shocks under standard preferences, is shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively.
The ﬁnal piece of the chain of arguments is displayed in Figure 8, which demonstrates that
the expansion in the aggregate investment rate as a response to a shock to idiosyncratic un-
certainty is a general equilibrium effect. The increase in investment is absent in partial equi-
librium, where we hold constant both wages and interest rates at their average level from the
generalequilibriumsimulation. Withnoincreaseinaggregatesavingandthusadecreaseinthe
real interest rate, the expectation of lower future productivity drives down the expected return
on capital and hence investment.
Figure 8: Impulse Response of the Aggregate Investment Rate to a Shock in Idiosyncratic Un-
certainty - GE vs. PE



































clearing wages and interest rates. ‘PE’ stands for partial equilibrium and means a model simulation, where wages
and interest rates are held constant at the average level in the ‘GE’-simulation.
To summarize: quantitatively realistic uncertainty shocks have bad news effects in general
equilibrium, and it is this news effect that dominates the time-varying real option value effect.
This shows again that general equilibrium is paramount to understanding the aggregate impli-
cations of shocks to idiosyncratic uncertainty.
385.2 Robustness Checks
Table 19: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS FOR THE ‘FULL MODEL’ AND ‘NEWS MODEL’
- DOUBLE VOLATILITY OF UNCERTAINTY (#Æ2)
Full ME-Full News ME-News
Model Model Model Model Data
Volatility
of Output 3.84% 3.72% 4.24% 4.19% 2.30%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.36 0.41 0.30 0.32 0.78
Investment 4.67 4.40 4.77 4.62 1.90
Employment 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.75 0.78
Persistence
Output 0.36 0.37 0.46 0.47 0.48
Consumption 0.68 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.67
Investment 0.25 0.23 0.41 0.42 0.42
Employment 0.23 0.21 0.40 0.42 0.61
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.78 0.81 0.85 0.87 0.66
Investment 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.83
Employment 0.95 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.68
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.61 0.62 0.75 0.78 0.60
Employment 0.55 0.55 0.72 0.75 0.36
Notes: See notes to Table 16.
In this subsection we provide robustness checks for our simulation results along two di-
mensions. First, we double the volatility of ﬁrm-level uncertainty, while keeping its steady state
value ﬁxed at 0.1201. This amounts to setting # Æ 2. Bloom (2009) uses a roughly seven times
more volatile ﬁrm-level uncertainty measure than we. While our empirical results are not con-
sistentwith#Æ7, theyareconsistentwithadoublingofthevolatilityofuncertainty. Weexplore
this here. Second, we re-scale the volatility of the aggregate Solow residual so that the cyclical
component of aggregate output in the model matches roughly the volatility of aggregate output
in the data, in order to make sure that our results are not driven by the general excess volatil-
ity generated by the baseline speciﬁcation. In particular, it could be that we falsely place too
much weight on ﬁrst-moment shocks by overestimating their volatility. None of these changes
39overturn our results, whether we control for measurement error or not. We display a further
robustness check in Table 39 in Appendix B.2, where we more than triple the adjustment costs
parameter, ¯ », and set it to unity. This is to check whether higher nonconvex adjustment costs
could give the wait-and-see effect are larger role. We ﬁnd that this is not the case.43
If we increase the ﬂuctuations in uncertainty, setting # Æ 2, the difference between ‘Full
Model’ and the ‘News Model’ becomes somewhat larger, see Table 19. Interestingly, the overall
volatility ofthemodeldecreases, theoneofoutputfrom4.04%to3.84%, whilethe relativestan-
dard deviations are fairly robust to #. This is a result of the mechanism highlighted in Bloom
et al. (2007): when uncertainty increases ﬁrms react less to ﬁrst moment shocks. We show here
that this effect survives general equilibrium price movements. The performance of the ‘Full
Model’ in terms of persistence is actually slightly worsened, while the contemporaneous corre-
lation of consumption and output, investment as well as employment drops to levels closer to
the data.44
The next robustness check concerns re-scaling the volatility of the aggregate Solow residual
by a factor of 0.6 in the ‘Full Model’, in order to approximately match the observed volatility
of cyclical aggregate output in the data. We keep this re-scaling factor the same for the ‘News
Model’ and the ‘RBC Model’. Despite the reduced importance of the ﬁrst-moment shock both
the absolute and the relative volatilities of the ‘Full Model’ and the ‘News Model’ remain very
similar. As before in the case of an increased volatility of the ﬁrm-level uncertainty – which is
essentially a weakening of the ﬁrst-moment shock from the other side –, we see a deterioration
(with the exception of consumption) in the persistence numbers, but an improvement in the
contemporaneous correlation of consumption and output in the ‘Full Model’ compared to the
data.
43We performed other robustness checks with respect to choices for the risk aversion parameter, ½I, º and µ.
Details are available on request.
44We also experimented with # Æ 4. The changes we ﬁnd for # Æ 2 are enforced. However, persistence of aggre-
gate investment and employment as well as the contemporaneous correlations between consumption on the one
hand and investment and employment on the other drop to counterfactually low levels. Moreover, Bachmann and
Bayer (2009) show that # Æ 4 is clearly incompatible with the procyclicality of investment dispersion found in the
micro data.
40Table 20: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS - RE-SCALED VOLATILITY OF THE AGGREGATE
SOLOW RESIDUAL
Full ME-Full News ME-News RBC
Model Model Model Model Model Data
Volatility
of Output 2.34% 2.24% 2.54% 2.49% 1.90% 2.30%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.35 0.40 0.30 0.32 0.38 0.78
Investment 4.58 4.35 4.65 4.52 4.30 1.90
Employment 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.78
Persistence
Output 0.38 0.39 0.46 0.47 0.31 0.48
Consumption 0.67 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.54 0.67
Investment 0.28 0.27 0.41 0.43 0.26 0.42
Employment 0.26 0.24 0.40 0.42 0.25 0.61
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.66
Investment 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.83
Employment 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.68
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.66 0.67 0.75 0.78 0.74 0.60
Employment 0.61 0.60 0.72 0.75 0.69 0.36
Notes: See notes to Table 16. The re-scaling factor is 0.6.
Higher Moments in the Krusell and Smith Rules
It remains to be shown that our results are not driven by the choice of only the average capi-
tal stock in the Krusell and Smith rules (9a) and (9b). While it is the case that in the presence of
countercyclical second-moment shocks the conventional R2¡measure is fairly low for the ‘Full
Model’ – at least in some combinations of the discrete aggregate states, the minimum is 0.8701
–, and while it is also true that including the skewness of the capital distribution in the Krusell
andSmithrulesofthe‘FullModel’45 leadstoanaverageincreaseoftheR2 forthecapitalregres-
sions from 0.9378 to 0.9870 and for the marginal utility of consumption regressions from 0.9962
to 0.9986, the aggregate behavior of the ‘Full Model’ is essentially unchanged. Better forecasts
45The ‘News Model’ features high R2 over 0.9997 on any aggregate state with the average capital stock only. In-
cluding the standard deviation of capital does not yield any signiﬁcant improvements in R2. The average R2 over
all discrete states for the skewness regression that is analogous to (9a) is 0.9261.
41do not necessarily induce the agents to behave differently (see Bachmann et al. (2008) for a
similar ﬁnding).46
Table 21: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS - HIGHER MOMENTS
Full Full News News
Model Model Model Model
MEAN SKEWNESS MEAN SKEWNESS
Volatility
of Output 4.04% 4.05% 4.24% 4.21%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.31
Investment 4.71 4.66 4.77 4.70
Employment 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.75
Persistence
Output 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.46
Consumption 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65
Investment 0.34 0.39 0.41 0.40
Employment 0.33 0.39 0.40 0.40
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.86
Investment 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Employment 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.76
Employment 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.73
Notes: See notes to Table 16. MEAN refers to a simulation, where only the aggregate capital stock is used in the
Krusell-Smith rules (9a)–(9b). SKEWNESS refers to a simulation, where also the skewness of the ﬁrm-level capital
stock distribution is used in the Krusell-Smith rules (9a)–(9b), plus an analogous rule to (9a) for skewness itself.
46We ﬁnd even somewhat better improvements in the R2 and again unaltered aggregate dynamics, when instead
of capital skewness we include the standard deviation of log ﬁrm-level Solow residuals as an additional moment in
theKrusellandSmithrules. Allﬁndingsarerobusttoincludingmeasurementerrorintheﬁrm-levelSolowresidual.
Numbers are available on request.
426 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper studies the cyclical behavior of the second moments of the cross-sections of ﬁrm-
level innovations to Solow residuals, real value added and real sales. We show that ﬁrm-speciﬁc
Solow residual innovations (likewise innovations in value added and sales) are more disperse
in recessions than in booms. Thus, ﬁrm-level uncertainty is signiﬁcantly and robustly counter-
cyclical in the way Bloom (2009) ﬁnds this for U.S. stock market and Compustat data. We also
show that the volatility of uncertainty is lower than has been previously found in this U.S. data.
We then explore the quantitative importance of these uncertainty ﬂuctuations in an other-
wise standard heterogeneous-ﬁrm dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in the spirit
of Khan and Thomas (2008) and Bachmann et al. (2008). We ﬁnd that empirically realistic ﬂuc-
tuations in uncertainty about productivity growth on their own are not sufﬁcient to generate
realistic business cycles. Adding the second moment shocks to a model that has standard ﬁrst
moment shocks, we ﬁnd that some aspects of the cyclical behavior of the model are altered. For
the size of uncertainty ﬂuctuations that we ﬁnd in German ﬁrm-level data, we attribute these
changes largely to the (bad) news uncertainty shocks carry about future aggregate productivity,
rather than to the wait-and-see-effect of such ﬂuctuations. In this context, we also ﬁnd that
general equilibrium price dynamics are paramount in understanding the aggregate effects of
ﬁrm-level uncertainty shocks.
Tosumupourﬁndings: uncertaintyshocksdonotappeartobemajordriversofyear-to-year
business cycle ﬂuctuations. This, however, leaves open the possibility that uncertainty shocks
are responsible for some particular episodes of the business cycle, recessions speciﬁcally. For
instance, one may wonder whether the recession in 2007 was driven by an uncertainty shock
and a wait-and-see ampliﬁcation? The following Table 22 suggests that at least for the U.S. this
does not seem to be the case. It displays for various investment and consumption categories
the percentage peak-trough decline of the 2007 recession relative to the average percentage
peak-trough decline of the nine other post-war U.S. recessions. It is obvious that the 2007 re-
cession is amongst the most severe in U.S. post-war history; all macroeconomic aggregates fell
by an above-average amount. However, investment and durable consumption decreased by
relatively less than nondurable consumption categories. Whereas the former declined between
twice and thrice as much as in the average recession, the latter declined ﬁvefold or twelvefold,
depending on the speciﬁc measure used. Also, whereas all durable categories saw some de-
cline in previous recessions (in seven out of ten durable consumption at the NBER trough was
lower than durable consumption at the NBER peak), the nondurable categories exhibited only
in roughly half of the recessions any decline at all. This obviously includes the 2007 recession.
All these statistics together show that the 2007 recession was especially severe for nondurable
43consumption categories, whereas an uncertainty shock combined with a wait-and-see ampliﬁ-
cation would at least suggest a particular severity for the durable expenditure elements. In fact,
the massive decline in nondurable consumption expenditures is rather consistent with a bad
news shock. Of course, this leaves open the possibility that other recessions in the past were
driven by the mechanism advocated in Bloom et al. (2009).
Table 22: THE RECESSION OF 2007 IN THE U.S.
Relative Decline # Declines # Declines
in this Crisis Peak-to-Trough
Total Fixed Investment 2.25 10 10
Nonresidential Fixed Investment 2.51 10 10
Durable Consumption 2.84 7 10
Nondurable Consumption 5.34 4 6
Nondurable Consumption + Services 11.89 2 5
Notes: Total Fixed Investment is GPDIC96 from the St. Louis FRED database; Nonresidential Fixed Investment PN-
FIC96; Durable Consumption PCDGCC96; Nondurable Consumption PCNDGC96; Services PCESVC96. All vari-
ables are real and in quarterly frequency. The ﬁrst column reports the percentage peak-trough decline of the 2007
recession relative to the average percentage peak-trough decline of the nine other post-war U.S. recessions. Peak
and trough are deﬁned by the ofﬁcial NBER recession dates. For the 2007 recession, we assume the trough to be in
the second quarter of 2009 owing to the lack of further data. The second column reports the number of recessions,
where the particular macroeconomic aggregate at the NBER trough was below its value from the NBER peak. The
third column reports the number of declines in the particular macroeconomic aggregate in a recession. There are
10 post-war recessions in the U.S.
In a companion paper (Bachmann and Bayer, 2009), using cross-sectional ﬁrm dynamics,
we provide further indirect evidence that the magnitude of uncertainty shocks over the busi-
ness cycle cannot be too large. We document there that the ﬁrm-level investment rates display
signiﬁcantly and robustly procyclical dispersion. We explain this fact through a procyclical ex-
tensive margin effect caused by lumpy capital adjustment. However, we also demonstrate there
thatincreasingthevolatility ofﬁrm-level uncertaintybeyondthelevelsweﬁndinthe datamiti-
gates this procyclical extensive margin effect. This allows us to bound the volatility of ﬁrm-level
uncertainty at at most double the value we measure in our baseline empirical speciﬁcation.
Since we base our results on German data, we leave open the possibility that shocks to un-
certainty are a major driving force for the business cycle in the U.S. Bayer and Juessen (2009)
ﬁnd for the cyclicality of wage risk striking differences between the U.S. and Germany, with the
formerdisplayingcountercyclicality(seealsoStoreslettenetal.,2004)andthelatterprocyclical-
ity. Thus, there is the possibility of a fundamental difference between the German and the U.S.
business cycle, and we encourage future research in this cross-country dimension. However,
44Table 22 and the ﬁnding that the service sector displays less strong countercyclicality of ﬁrm-
leveluncertaintytogetherwiththefactthatthissectorislargerintheU.S.thaninGermanysug-
gest otherwise. This is conﬁrmed by Bachmann and Sims (2009), which uses monthly sectoral
survey data, i.e. higher frequency data than balance sheet information, on business expecta-
tions in Germany and the U.S. to show that disagreement in survey responses – a well-known
proxy for uncertainty – acts like a bad news shock in both countries without any evidence for
wait-and-see. We ﬁnally leave open the possibility that the dispersion shocks we measure in
the data can be a source of aggregate ﬂuctuations in a signiﬁcantly altered model environment;
for instance one, where the asset markets and their volatility are more explicitly modeled (see
Gilchrist et al., 2009, or Christiano et al., 2007). Also, Geanakoplos (2009) has proposed an in-
teresting mechanism – the leverage cycle – where uncertainty shocks have to accompany ﬁrst-
moment shocks to transform ‘badnews’ into ‘scary news’. We thus view future research into the
precise interaction between uncertainty and aggregate dynamics as desirable.
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48A Appendix A - Data Appendix
A.1 Description of the Sample
The Bundesbank’s corporate balance sheet database (Unternehmensbilanzstatistik, USTAN
henceforth)hasbeenoriginallycreatedasaby-productofthebank’srediscountingactivities,an
importantinstrumentofmonetarypolicybeforetheintroductionoftheEuro. Whenacommer-
cial bank wished to pledge a commercial bill of exchange to the Bundesbank, the commercial
bank had to prove the creditworthiness of the bill. For that purpose the bank had to provide
the Bundesbank with balance sheet information of all parties who backed the bill of exchange.
By law, the Bundesbank could only accept bills backed by at least three parties known to be
creditworthy. This procedure allowed the Bundesbank to collect a data set with information
stemming from the balance sheets and the proﬁt and loss accounts of ﬁrms (see Stoess (2001),
von Kalckreuth (2003) and Doepke et al. (2005) for further details).
Quality standards of the data are particularly high. All mandatory data collected for USTAN
have been double-checked by Bundesbank staff. Hence, the data should contain unusually few
errors for a micro-data set. One drawback of USTAN is that with the introduction of the EURO,
the Bundesbank stopped buying commercial bills and collected ﬁrm balance sheet data only
irregularly and from publicly available sources. For this reason, the data set stops being useful
in 1999. Therefore, we only use data from 1971 to 1998, which leaves us with essentially 26 year
observations from 1973 to 1998 because of lagging and ﬁrst-differencing.
The coverage of the sample is broad, although it is technically not a representative sam-
ple due to the non-random sample design. It was also more common to use bills of exchange
in manufacturing and for incorporated companies, which biases our data somewhat towards
these kinds of ﬁrms. And, of course, the Bundesbank would only rediscount bills with a good
rating, so that the set of ﬁrms in USTAN is also somewhat biased to ﬁnancially healthy and
larger ﬁrms.
Nevertheless, USTANcoversawiderangeofﬁrms,sinceshort-termﬁnancingthroughcom-
mercial bills of exchange was common practice for many German companies across all busi-
ness sectors (see Table 24 below for the detailed sectoral composition of our ﬁnal sample). US-
TAN also has a broad ownership coverage ranging from incorporated ﬁrms as well as privately
owned companies, which distinguishes it from the Compustat data. Within the former group
USTAN covers both untraded corporations (e.g. limited liability ﬁrms, GmbH) as well as pub-
licly held companies (AG) – see Table 27 below. Finally, USTAN features also a relatively broad
size coverage, as we will show in Table 25 below for our ﬁnal sample, the creation of which we
describe in some detail now.
We start out with the universe of observations in the USTAN data, merging the ﬁles for
1971-1986 and 1987-1998. In a ﬁrst pass, we then drop all balance sheets that are irregular,
49e.g. bankruptcy or closing balance sheets, or stem from a holding (Konzernbilanz). This leaves
us with only regular balance sheets (Handelsbilanz or Steuerbilanz). We also drop all ﬁrms
with missing payroll data and missing or negative sales data, which are basically non-operating
ﬁrms. A small amount of duplicate balance sheets is removed as well. And ﬁnally, we drop the
following sectors: hospitality (hotels and restaurants), which has only a small amount of ﬁrms
in the database, ﬁnancial and insurance institutions, the mostly public health and education
sectors, as well as other public companies like museums, etc. and some other small service in-
dustries, such as hair cutters, dry cleaners and funeral homes;47 or when sectoral information
was missing. The sectoral aggregate we are studying can be roughly characterized as the non-
ﬁnancial private business sector in Germany. This leaves us with an initial data set of 1,764,846
ﬁrm-year observations and 259,614 ﬁrms. The average number of ﬁrms per year is 63,030.
From this initial data set we remove step-by-step more observations, in order to get an eco-
nomically reasonable data set. We ﬁrst drop observations from likely East German ﬁrms to
avoid a break of the series in 1990. We identify a West German ﬁrm as a ﬁrm that has a West
German address or has no address information but enters the sample before 1990. Then we
recompute capital stocks with a modiﬁed perpetual inventory method (PIM) and employment
levels. In the modiﬁed PIM we drop a small amount of observations from the top and bottom
of the distribution of correction factors for the initial capital stock, see Appendix A.2. Extreme
correction factors indicate that constant depreciation is not a good approximation for this par-
ticular ﬁrm. Such a ﬁrm will have had an episode of extraordinary depreciation (e.g. ﬁre, a
natural disaster, etc.) and the capital stocks by PIM will be a bad measure of the actual capital
after the disaster. We remove observations that do not have a log value added and a log capital
stock after PIM. Another large part is removed due to not featuring changes in log ﬁrm-level
employment, capital and real value added, which obviously requires us to observe ﬁrms for two
consecutive years. Then we remove outliers in factor changes and real value added changes.
Speciﬁcally, we identify as outliers in our sample a ﬁrm-year in which the ﬁrm level investment
rate or log changes in ﬁrm-level real value added, employment and capital stock fall outside
a three standard deviations band around the ﬁrm and sectoral-year mean. Then we compute
ﬁrm-levelSolowresiduals(seeAppendixA.4fordetails)andsimilarlyremoveobservationswith
missinglogchangesinSolowresidualsaswellasoutlierstherein. Weﬁnallyremove–beforeand
after each step of the outlier removal – ﬁrms that have less than ﬁve observations in ﬁrm-level
Solow residual changes. We conduct extensive robustness checks of our results to the choices
for the outlier and observation thresholds (see Appendix B.1). Table 23 summarizes, how much
observations are dropped in each step.
47The number of ﬁrms from the public sector and these small industries is tiny to begin with, as they did not use
commercial bills as a ﬁnancing instrument. We left out ﬁnancial and insurance institutions, as they arguably have
a very different production function and investment behavior.
50Table 23: SAMPLE CREATION
Criterion Drops of Firm-Year Observations
East Germany 104,299
Outliers in PIM 7,539
Missing log value added 1,349
Missing log capital 31,819
Missing log-changes in N, K, VA 161,668
Outliers in factor and VA log-changes 41,453
Missing log-changes in Solow residual 126,086
Outliers in Solow residual log-changes 18,978
Not enough observations 417,550
Total 910,741
The ﬁnal sample then consists of 854,105 ﬁrm-year observations, which amounts to obser-
vations on 72,853 ﬁrms and the average observation length of a ﬁrm in the sample is 11.7 years.
The average number of ﬁrms per year is 32,850. The following Tables 24 and 25 as well as 26
and 27 show the average sectoral 48 and the size distributions in our sample, as well as the dis-
tributions over the number of observations and legal forms, respectively.
Table 24: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION
Fraction of
ID Sector Observations Observations WZ 2003
10 Agriculture 12,291 1.44% A, B
20 Energy & Mining 4,165 0.49% C, E
31 Chemical Industry, Oil 14,721 1.72% DF, DG
32 Plastics, Rubber 23,892 2.80% DH
33 Glass, Ceramics 28,623 3.35% DI
34 Metals 30,591 3.58% DJ
35 Machinery 162,407 19.01% DK, DL, DM, DN
36 Wood, Paper, Printing 61,672 7.22% DD, DE
37 Textiles, Leather 46,173 5.41% DB, DC
38 Food, Tobacco 37,708 4.41% DA
40 Construction 54,569 6.39% F
61 Wholesale Trade 213,071 24.95% G51
62 Retail Trade & Cars 142,137 16.64% G50, G51
70 Transportation & Communication 22,085 2.59% I
Total 854,105
48WZ 2003 is the industry classiﬁcation from 2003 that the German national accounting system
(Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung, VGR) uses.
51Table 25: SIZE DISTRIBUTIONS OF FIRMS
Number of
Employees 1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 500+
Fraction 6.14% 9.46% 8.24% 7.30% 26.28% 17.04% 14.37% 5.68% 5.49%
Capital Stock
(in 1000 1991-Euro) 0-299 300-599 600-999 1,000-1,499 1,500-2,499 2,500-4,999 5,000-9,999 10,000-24,999 25,000+
Fraction 8.23% 9.01% 9.67% 9.36% 13.08% 17.71% 13.87% 11.08% 7.99%
Real Value Added
(in 1000 1991-Euro) 0-299 300-499 500-999 1,000-1,499 1,500-2,499 2,500-4,999 5,000-9,999 10,000-24,999 25,000+
Fraction 8.17% 7.93% 16.38% 11.56% 14.45% 16.28% 11.20% 8.25% 5.79%
Table 26: OBSERVATION DISTRIBUTION
Obs. per Firm Firms Percent Cum. Obs. per Firm Firms Percent Cum.
5 8,973 12.32 12.32 16 2,487 3.41 78.10
6 7,592 10.42 22.74 17 2,225 3.05 81.16
7 6,609 9.07 31.81 18 2,024 2.78 83.93
8 5,724 7.86 39.67 19 1,849 2.54 86.47
9 4,901 6.73 46.39 20 1,619 2.22 88.69
10 4,338 5.95 52.35 21 1,479 2.03 90.72
11 3,960 5.44 57.78 22 1,351 1.85 92.58
12 3,528 4.84 62.63 23 1,446 1.98 94.56
13 3,134 4.30 66.93 24 988 1.36 95.92
14 3,006 4.13 71.05 25 892 1.22 97.14
15 2,647 3.63 74.69 26 2081 2.86 100
Total 72,853
Table 27: LEGAL FORM DISTRIBUTION
Legal Form Observations Frequency
Publicly Traded (AG, KGaA, etc.) 18,582 2.18%
Limited Liability Companies (GmbH, GmbH&Co., etc.) 506,184 59.26%
Fully Liable Partnerships (OHG, KG, etc.) 327,526 38.35%
Other: unincorporated associations (e.V.) 1,813 0.21%
municipal agencies (Körperschaften öR) etc.
Total 854,105 100%
52How well does the USTAN aggregate represent the non-ﬁnancial private business sector
(NFPBS) in Germany? USTAN represents on average 70% of the value added of the NFPBS and
78% of its gross output.49 The NFPBS, in turn, comprises 59% and 69%, respectively, of aggre-
gate real value added and real gross output.
Figure9 showsthatexceptforacertainoverrepresentationofmanufacturing(atleast,when
measuredinvalueadded)andacertainunderrepresentationofthetransportationandcommu-
nication sector, USTAN represents the sectoral composition in NFPBS rather well.
Figure 9: Sectoral Composition in USTAN and NFPBS

























Notes: Graphs display the fraction of the sum of real value added and gross output respectively, over all ﬁrms by
1-digit sector within the USTAN sample over the NFPBS aggregate.
Figure 10 demonstrates that also the cyclical behavior of USTAN and NFPBS is close. The
49 To compute these statistics we only average over the data from 1973 to 1990, because from then on German
national accounting does no longer report West and East Germany separately. For the business cycle statistics we
use the post-reuniﬁcation data, but ﬁlter separately before and after this structural break. NFPBS value added is
taken from Bruttowertschoepfung in jeweiligen Preisen, table 3.2.1 of VGR, deﬂated year-by-year by the implicit
deﬂator for aggregate value added, table 3.1.1 of VGR (we apply the same deﬂator to USTAN data). The base year is
always 1991. We experiment also with implicit sector-speciﬁc deﬂators for value added from table 3.2.1 and 3.2.2
of VGR, and results are robust to this. NFPBS gross output is taken from Produktionswerte in jeweiligen Preisen, ta-
ble 3.2.3 of VGR, deﬂated year-by-year by the implicit deﬂator for aggregate gross output, gathered from table 3.2.6
of VGR. NFPBS investment is Bruttoanlageinvestitionen in jeweiligen Preisen from table 3.2.8.1, deﬂated with the
implicit sector-speciﬁc investment price deﬂators given by Bruttoanlageinvestitionen - preisbereinigt, a chain in-
dex, from table 3.2.9.1, VGR. NFPBS capital is Nettoanlagevermoegen in Preisen von 2000 from table 3.2.19.1, VGR,
re-chained to 1991 prices. In both the computation of investment and capital data for USTAN in the PIM we use
the implicit sector and capital good speciﬁc (equipment and non-residential structures) deﬂators for investment:
tables 3.2.8.2, 3.2.9.2., 3.2.8.3 and 3.2.9.3., VGR. We also experiment with deﬂating USTAN data with a uniform
investment price deﬂator, the Preisindex der Investitionsgueterproduzenten, source: GP-X002, Statistisches Bunde-
samt. NFPBS employment is number of employed, Arbeitnehmer, from table 3.2.13, VGR. Payroll is taken from
Arbeitnehmerentgelt, table 3.2.10., VGR, deﬂated by the same general implicit deﬂator for aggregate value added
that we use to deﬂate value added numbers. Aggregate total hours comes from Geleistete Arbeitsstunden der Ar-
beitnehmer, table 2.9, VGR. Finally, real privateconsumptiondata areprivate Konsumausgaben, achainindex with
base year in 1991, from table 3.2 in the VGR.
53correlationofthecyclicalcomponentsofvalueaddedis0.7671andforgrossoutputitis0.6049.50
Figure 10: Cyclical Behavior in USTAN and NFPBS























Notes: Upper panel: time series for the sum of real value added over all ﬁrms in the USTAN sample and NFBS after
detrending with logarithmic ﬁrst differences and a deterministic linear trend. Lower panel: time series for the sum
ofrealgrossoutputoverallﬁrmsintheUSTANsampleandNFBSafterdetrendingwithlogarithmicﬁrstdifferences
and a deterministic linear trend.
A.2 Capital Stocks
In order to obtain economically meaningful stocks of capital series for each ﬁrm, we have to
re-calculate capital stocks in a Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). The ﬁrst step is to compute
ﬁrm-level investment series, ii,t, from the corporate balance sheets, which contain data only
on accounting capital stocks, ka
i,t, and accounting total depreciation, da
i,t. The following accu-






The next step is to recognize that capital stocks from corporate balance sheets are not di-
rectly usable for economic analysis for two reasons: 1) accounting depreciation, da
i,t, in cor-
porate balance sheets is often motivated by tax reasons and typically higher than economic
50Wetakeﬁrstdifferencesoflogvalueaddedaswellasgrossoutputandthentakeoutforbothadeterministiclin-
ear trend to remove the growth of the USTAN sample over time. The correlation between only the ﬁrst differences
in log value added is still 0.5348, and 0.4966, when an HP(100)-ﬁlter is applied.
51Speciﬁcally, ka
i,t is the sum of balance sheet items ap65, Technische Anlagen und Maschinen, and ap66, Andere
Anlagen, Betriebs-und Geschaeftsausstattung, for equipment; and balance sheet item ap64, Grundstuecke, Bauten,
for structures. Since balance sheet data are typically end-of-year stock data, notice that ka
i,t is the end-of-period
capital stock in year t ¡1. da
i,t is proﬁt and loss account item ap156, Abschreibungen auf Sachanlagen und imma-
terielle Vermoegensgegenstaende des Anlagevermoegens. In contrast to ka
i,t, da
i,t is not given for each capital good
separately. For the solution of this complication, see below.
54depreciation, ±e
i,t, expressed as a rate; 2) accounting capital stocks are reported at historical




t (assuming that pI
t increases over time). We therefore apply a Perpetual Inventory





















i,1 is the accounting capital stock in prices of 1991 at the beginning of an uninterrupted
sequence of ﬁrm observations – if for a ﬁrm-year we have a missing investment observation,
the PIM is started anew, when the ﬁrm appears again in the data set. We estimate ±e
t for each
year from national accounting data, VGR, separately for equipment and non-residential struc-
tures(table3.1.3,VGR,NettoanlagevermoegennachVermoegensarteninjeweiligenPreisen,Aus-
ruestungen und Nichtwohnbauten; table 3.1.4, VGR, Abschreibungen nach Vermoegensarten in
jeweiligen Preisen, Ausruestungen und Nichtwohnbauten). VGR contains sectoral and capital
good speciﬁc depreciation data only after 1991, which is why we decided to use only capital
good speciﬁc depreciation rates for the entire time horizon. For the data sources for invest-
ment price deﬂators see footnote 49. The drawback of this procedure is that we do not observe
directly capital-good speciﬁc da
i,t in the balance sheets (differently from ka
i,t), so that (13) is not
directly applicable for the two types of capital goods separately. We therefore split up da
i,t ac-
cording to the fraction that each capital good accounts for in the book value of total capital,
weighting each capital good by its VGR depreciation rate. Creating a capital series for both cap-
ital goods this way is mainly meant to provide a better estimate for total capital for each ﬁrm,
because we ﬁnally aggregate up both types of capital into a single capital good at the ﬁrm-level.
There is a ﬁnal complication, which comes through relying on ka
i,1 as the starting value of
the PIM. It is typically not a good estimate of the productive real capital stock of the ﬁrm at that




i,t, and replace ka
i,1 by Áka
i,1 in the perpetual inventory method. We do this iteratively,


































i,t, Á(0) Æ1. We stop when for each sector and each capital good category ÁÇ1.1.
Since for our purposes we want to compute economic, i.e. productive, capital stocks, we
then – as a ﬁnal step – add to the capital stock series from this iterative PIM the net present
value of the real expenditures for renting and leasing equipment and structures.52
A.3 Labor Inputs
AmoreparticulardifﬁcultywithUSTANdataisthatinformationonthenumberofemployeesis
only updated infrequently for some companies, as it is not taken directly from balance sheets,
but sampled from supplementary company information. Being no balance sheet item, the em-
ployment data is not constrained by legal accounting rules and did not undergo consistency
checks by Bundesbank staff. However, in order to compute ﬁrm-level Solow residuals, we need
some measure of employment.
We base this measure on the payroll data (wagebilli,t) from the proﬁt and loss statements
(itemap154,Personalaufwand). Payrolldataisregulatedbyaccountingstandardsandischecked
for consistency by the Bundesbank using accounting identities. In contrast to the direct em-
ployment data, the payroll data is generally considered of high quality. Therefore, we exploit
this data to construct a proxy measure for (log) employment ni,t as follows (with a slight abuse
of notation, we use ni,t here for log employment).
The idea behind our proxy measure is that we can determine sectoral average wages even
though ﬁrm level employment is measured with error. Since wage bargaining in Germany is
highly centralized, the sectoral average wage is all we need then, since it is a good proxy for ﬁrm
level wages. Therefore, dividing ﬁrm level payroll by the sectoral average wage recovers true
ﬁrm level employment.
52 Speciﬁcally,wetakeitemap161,Miet-undPachtaufwendungen,fromtheproﬁtandlossaccounts,deﬂateitby
the implicit investment good price deﬂator, which we compute, in turn, from tables 3.2.8.1 and 3.2.9.1 from VGR,
and then divide it by a measure of the user cost of capital. The latter is simply the sum of real interest rates for a
given year, which - courtesy of the Bundesbank - we compute from nominal interest rates on corporate bonds and
ex-postCPIinﬂationdata(theseriesisavailablefromtheauthorsuponrequest),andthetime-average,accounting
capital-good weighted depreciation rate per ﬁrm.




i,t Æni,t Å"i,t. (19)
Then we decompose the wage per employee, !i,t, of ﬁrm i at time t into two effects. One is
determined by a ﬁrm-time-speciﬁc wage component wi,t, and the other one being region-,
r (i,t), sector-, j (i,t), and size-class-speciﬁc, s(i,t), where j (i,t), r (i,t) and s(i,t) denote that
ﬁrm i belongs to sector j, region r and size-class s at time t, respectively.54 Thus, we write
!i,t Æ ¯ wj(i,t),r(i,t),s(i,t),t Åwi,t. (20)





we can estimate a sector-region-size wage component, ¯ wj,r,s,t, as:55

















We then use this estimate of the average wage rate to estimate employment on the basis of the
ﬁrm’s wage bill:
ˆ nit Æ logwagebillit ¡c ¯ wj,r,s,t (22)



































The second equality stems from using (19). The next to last equality holds, because one can
replace !it by (20), realizing that the ¯ w, which do not depend on a speciﬁc ﬁrm, cancel. The
last equality holds, because, by construction, the average ﬁrm-level deviation from a sector-
53We use item ap34, Beschaeftigtenzahl im Durchschnitt des Geschaeftsjahres, to measure n¤
i,t, where available.
54Speciﬁcally, for sectors we use the 2-digit classiﬁcation in Table 24 in Appendix A.1. For size classes we use
terciles of the capital distribution in each year. For the region-speciﬁc wage component we proceed as follows: we
divideWestGermany into three regions, accordingtozipcodes: Southwithzipcodes startingwith7,8,9, exceptfor
98 and 99; Middle with zip codes starting with 4,5,6, except for 48 and 59; North with zip codes starting with 2,3 as
well as 48 and 59. However, not all balance sheets feature zip code information, which is why we compute c ¯ wj,r,s,t
with and without a region component. For those ﬁrms that do not have zip code information or for those ﬁrms
that are in sector-region-size bins with fewer than 50 observations in a given year, we take the estimate without the
region component.
55To estimate c ¯ wj,r,s,t we of course use only those observations, where n¤
i,t, i.e. item ap34, Beschaeftigtenzahl im
Durchschnitt des Geschaeftsjahres, is available.










is negligible. In addition, since wage bargaining is highly centralized
in Germany, also the ﬁrm speciﬁc wage component, wit, can be expected to be of lesser impor-
tance, i.e. the variance ¾2
w is small. In particular it can be expected to be smaller than the initial
measurement error in employment stocks. Therefore our measure of employment, ˆ ni,t, should
follow real employment, ni,t, more closely than n¤
i,t.
To corroborate this claim, we checked our procedure using data from the German social
security records at the Institut fuer Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), which provide in-
formation on the wage bill and employment at the establishment level. There we observe true
employment and wage bills for all plants and the time 1975-2006. Constraining ourselves to the
sampleperiod1975-1998andtoplantswithmorethan12employees,i.e. todatacomparableto




variance of employment changes (¾2
¢n Æ0.0163, ¾2
¢ˆ n Æ0.0162). Finally, a correlation coefﬁcient
between mean(¢ni,t) in the USTAN data and the log-change in aggregate NFPBS employment
of 0.653 shows also the quality of our employment measure.
A.4 Solow Residual Calculation
With the estimated ﬁrm-level capital stocks and employment levels we can now compute ﬁrm-
level Solow residuals from the logged production function (1). In our baseline speciﬁcation we
estimate the factor elasticities, º and µ, as 1-digit sector-speciﬁc median, pooled over all ﬁrm-
year observations in a sector, expenditure shares.56 Table 28 displays the estimated elasticities.
Notice that for the aggregate Solow residual calculation for the baseline simulations, for which
weusethedatasourcesspeciﬁedinFootnote49inAppendixA.1,wesimplyusetheexpenditure
shares from manufacturing, as manufacturing is still the largest sector within NFPBS (had we
used any weighted median of expenditure shares the result would have been the same).
To check the robustness of our results, we also try alternative speciﬁcations with predeﬁned
elasticities common across sectors. We ﬁrst try a combination of º and µ, SR(2), such that a one
56Weuseproﬁtandlossaccountitemap153,Rohergebnis,forﬁrm-levelvalueaddedanddeﬂateitinthebaseline
scenario with the aggregate value added deﬂator, but experiment also with sector-speciﬁc value added deﬂators,
see Footnote 49 in Appendix A.1 for details. To compute ﬁrm-level expenditure shares, we proceed as follows:
the labor share is simply total payroll divided by value added (ap154/ap153); capital expenditures, which are then
again divided by value added, are the sum of the PIM capital stock and the net present value of renting and leasing
expenditures multiplied by the user cost of capital as speciﬁed in Footnote 52 in Appendix A.2. For ﬁrm-level sales
we use proﬁt and loss account item ap144, Umsatzerloese, and deﬂate it with the aggregate value added deﬂator.
For ﬁrm-level sales we use proﬁt and loss account item ap151, Aufwendungen fuer Roh-, Hilfs-, und Betriebsstoffe
und fuer bezogene Waren, and deﬂate it again with the aggregate value added deﬂator.
58Table 28: SECTOR-SPECIFIC EXPENDITURE SHARES
ID Sector labor share º capital share µ
1 Agriculture 0.2182 0.7310
2 Energy & Mining 0.3557 0.5491
3 Manufacturing 0.5565 0.2075
4 Construction 0.6552 0.1771
6 Trade 0.4536 0.2204
7 Transport & Communication 0.4205 0.2896
third share of capital in a CRTS production function and a reduced form revenue elasticity of
capital of 0.5 are compatible. This implies an implicit markup of 1.33, if one were to rationalize
DRTS with a CRTS production function and monopolistic competition. We then either ﬁx the
revenue elasticity of capital (SR5, SR3) or ﬁx the one third share of capital in a CRTS production
function (SR6, SR4) and lower the markup. Table 29 summarizes the scenarios.
Table 29: OVERVIEW OVER THE DIFFERENT SOLOW RESIDUAL SPECIFICATIONS
labor share capital share CRTS capital share markup revenue elasticity






Baseline 0.5565 0.2075 0.31 1.32 0.47
SR2 0.5 0.25 0.33 1.33 0.5
SR3 0.6667 0.1667 0.2 1.20 0.5
SR4 0.5556 0.2778 0.33 1.20 0.63
SR5 0.6 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.5
SR6 0.5333 0.2667 0.33 1.25 0.57
59A.5 Cross-sectional Dispersion Data
Table 30: CROSS-SECTIONAL DISPERSION DATA FOR THE LOG-CHANGES IN SOLOW RESIDUALS,
VALUE ADDED AND SALES IN THE BASELINE EMPIRICAL SCENARIO
Year std(¢log²i,t) std(¢logyi,t) std(¢logsalesi,t)
1973 0.12204 0.14743 0.17619
1974 0.12784 0.15719 0.20029
1975 0.13017 0.16057 0.20948
1976 0.12285 0.14851 0.2013
1977 0.11902 0.14056 0.18989
1978 0.1182 0.13888 0.19715
1979 0.11875 0.13843 0.18751
1980 0.11945 0.13881 0.18311
1981 0.12397 0.14369 0.18629
1982 0.12395 0.14519 0.18548
1983 0.12137 0.14378 0.18798
1984 0.12086 0.14251 0.18383
1985 0.12065 0.14491 0.18567
1986 0.1212 0.14179 0.1901
1987 0.12028 0.14024 0.18593
1988 0.11673 0.13571 0.18348
1989 0.1143 0.1328 0.17782
1990 0.11868 0.1401 0.18643
1991 0.12155 0.14548 0.18557
1992 0.12014 0.14218 0.18209
1993 0.12166 0.14537 0.19942
1994 0.12075 0.1408 0.18527
1995 0.1184 0.13602 0.18021
1996 0.11722 0.13396 0.17517
1997 0.11203 0.12965 0.176
1998 0.11017 0.13004 0.17971
Notes: std: cross-sectional standard deviation of the within-transformed data. No detrending.
B Appendix B - Robustness
B.1 Further Robustness on the Empirical Results
Table 31 shows that the three main empirical ﬁndings of this paper – high idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty and countercyclicality as well as small volatility of idiosyncratic uncertainty – are robust
to both different pre-speciﬁed and uniform-across-sectors factor elasticities in the production
function as well as different lag structures in the production factors: Baselinevar1 assumes pre-
determined labor in addition to predetermined capital, whereas Baselinevar2 has both labor
and capital productive instantaneously. Tables 32 to 37 show the analogous results of Tables 5
to 9 and Table 12 in Section 2.3 for std(¢logyi,t) and std(¢logsalesi,t), respectively.
60Table 31: ROBUSTNESS FOR DIFFERENT SOLOW RESIDUAL SPECIFICATIONS
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
std(¢log²i,t)Baseline 2.67% -0.481 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)SR2 2.71% -0.491 0.122
std(¢log²i,t)SR3 2.39% -0.517 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)SR4 2.56% -0.481 0.123
std(¢log²i,t)SR5 2.51% -0.510 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)SR6 2.62% -0.486 0.122
std(¢log²i,t)Baselinevar1 3.64% -0.591 0.154
std(¢log²i,t)Baselinevar2 2.63% -0.501 0.117
Notes: std: cross-sectional standard deviation, linearly detrended. cv: time series coefﬁcient of variation. ½: time
series correlation coefﬁcient.
¹: time series average. HP(¸)¡Y : Cyclical component of GDP after HP-ﬁltering using smoothing parameter ¸.
















Notes: See notes to Table 31. N refers to aggregate employment.
61Table 33: MORE ROBUSTNESS
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
iqr(¢logyi,t) 6.13% -0.413 0.150
std(¢logyi,t)raw 3.95% -0.394 0.153
std(¢logyi,t)1973¡1990 3.72% -0.650 0.143
std(¢logyi,t)1977¡1998 3.32% -0.235 0.140
iqr(¢logsalesi,t) 8.22% -0.343 0.162
std(¢logsalesi,t)raw 4.05% -0.306 0.199
std(¢logsalesi,t)1973¡1990 3.90% -0.432 0.189
std(¢logsalesi,t)1977¡1998 2.78% -0.094 0.185
Notes: See notes to Table 31. iqr stands for interquartile range, which is linearly detrended.
Table 34: RESULTS BY SECTOR
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y Sect.) ¹(¢)
std(¢logyi,t)Aggregate 3.73% -0.451 - 0.142
std(¢logyi,t)AGR 4.24% 0.044 -0.324 0.176
std(¢logyi,t)MIN/ENE 11.39% -0.221 0.144 0.116
std(¢logyi,t)MAN 5.03% -0.579 -0.323 0.140
std(¢logyi,t)CON 4.77% -0.614 -0.442 0.150
std(¢logyi,t)TRD 3.48% -0.057 -0.335 0.141
std(¢logyi,t)TRA/COM 4.30% 0.117 0.177 0.151
std(¢logsalesi,t)Aggregate 3.82% -0.405 - 0.187
std(¢logsalesi,t)AGR 10.14% -0.060 0.029 0.217
std(¢logsalesi,t)MIN/ENE 18.12% 0.047 0.049 0.118
std(¢logsalesi,t)MAN 4.66% -0.506 -0.293 0.170
std(¢logsalesi,t)CON 6.99% -0.064 -0.084 0.328
std(¢logsalesi,t)TRD 5.93% -0.267 -0.223 0.176
std(¢logsalesi,t)TRA/COM 8.06% -0.27 -0.237 0.174
Notes: SeenotestoTable31. AGR:Agriculture; MIN/ENE:Mining&Energy; MAN:Manufacturing; CON:Construc-
tion; TRD: Trade (Retail & Wholesale); TRA/COM: Transportation & Communication. Y refers to the output of the
aggregate of the non-ﬁnancial private business sector. Y Sect. refers to the output of the corresponding sector.
62Table 35: RESULTS BY FIRM SIZE
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
std(¢log²i,t)Aggregate 2.67% -0.481 0.120
Firm Size By Capital
std(¢log²i,t)First Quartile 1.81% -0.487 0.136
std(¢log²i,t)Second Quartile 2.54% -0.297 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)Third Quartile 3.76% -0.485 0.114
std(¢log²i,t)Fourth Quartile 4.13% -0.479 0.109
std(¢log²i,t)Largest 5% 4.71% -0.464 0.106
Firm Size By Value Added
std(¢log²i,t)First Quartile 1.95% -0.438 0.138
std(¢log²i,t)Second Quartile 2.77% -0.462 0.119
std(¢log²i,t)Third Quartile 3.32% -0.436 0.114
std(¢log²i,t)SMALL95 4.15% -0.424 0.107
std(¢log²i,t)Largest 5% 4.90% -0.436 0.100
Notes: See notes to Table 31. First Quartile refers to the smallest 25% ﬁrms in a given year, Second Quartile to the
ﬁrms with size in the 25%-50% range, etc., if size is measured in capital stock and real value added, respectively.
Table 36: RESULTS BY LEGAL FORM
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
¾(¢logyi,t)Aggregate 3.73% -0.451 0.142
std(¢logyi,t)Publicly Traded 6.12% -0.322 0.126
std(¢logyi,t)Limited Liability 4.29% 0.484 0.145
std(¢logyi,t)Unlimited Liability 3.42% -0.396 0.138
¾(¢logsalesi,t)Aggregate 3.82% -0.405 0.187
std(¢logsalesi,t)Publicly Traded 17.18% 0.086 0.157
std(¢logsalesi,t)Limited Liability 4.72% -0.414 0.193
std(¢logsalesi,t)Unlimited Liability 4.18% -0.172 0.178




63Table 37: RESULTS BY MATERIAL USAGE
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
std(¢logyi,t)Aggregate 3.73% -0.451 0.142
std(¢logyi,t)Material Intensity const. 5.94% -0.270 0.117
std(¢logsalesi,t)Aggregate 3.82% -0.405 0.187
std(¢logsalesi,t)Material Intensity const. 6.64% -0.277 0.124
Notes: SeenotestoTable31. MaterialIntensityconst. referstoﬁrmswhosematerial expendituresoversales
mi,t
salesi,t
have changed by less then one percentage point in absolute terms.
We next provide further evidence for the robustness of the three empirical ﬁndings of this
paper to sample selection and variable construction. First, we use sector-speciﬁc price deﬂators
for value added instead of the aggregate one (for sources see Footnote 49 in Appendix A.1). Sec-
ond, we use an aggregate price deﬂator for investment goods (see Footnote 49 in Appendix A.1
fordetails)intheperpetualinventorymethodinsteadofsectoraldeﬂatorsseparatelyforequip-
ment and structures. Third, we employ a stricter outlier removal criterion of 2.5 standard devi-
ations around the ﬁrm- and year-speciﬁc mean in Solow residual and value added innovations,
as well as investment rates and employment changes. Fourth, we use a more liberal outlier cri-
terionusing5and10standarddeviationsinsteadof3.57 Fifth, weemployaspeciﬁcation, where
we assume that an outlier above 3 standard deviations means a merger and, subsequently, treat
these ﬁrms as new ﬁrms in addition to removing them in the year, where the outlier occurs.
Sixth, we use all the ﬁrms that we observe at least twice with ﬁrst differences.58 Finally, we carry
out a more standard perpetual inventory method that simply uses the reported capital stocks
in the ﬁrst year of observation for a ﬁrm, instead of solving a ﬁxed point problem in correction
factors (see Appendix A.2 for details). As one can see from Table 38, the results are robust to all
these alternative sampling procedures.
57The latter variant lowers the number of dropped ﬁrm-year observations due to outliers in factor and value
added changes from 41,453 to 4,240, and the ones due to outliers in Solow residual changes from 18,978 to 1,486.
This leaves the total number of ﬁrm-year observations at 934,315 and the total number of ﬁrms in the sample at
78,092.
58This lowers the number of dropped ﬁrm-year observations due to not satisfying the minimum observation
requirement from 417,550 to 158,950. This leaves the total number of ﬁrm-year observations at 971,308 and the
total number of ﬁrms in the sample at 114,528.
64Table 38: MORE ROBUSTNESS
Cross-sectional Moment cv(¢) ½(¢,HP(100)¡Y ) ¹(¢)
std(¢log²i,t)Baseline 2.67% -0.481 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)Sectoral deﬂators for VA 2.66% -0.483 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)Uniform price index for I-goods 2.68% -0.480 0.120
std(¢log²i,t)Stricter outlier removal 2.51% -0.499 0.109
std(¢log²i,t)Looser outlier removal 2.88% -0.476 0.150
std(¢log²i,t)Very loose outlier removal 5.10% -0.578 0.195
std(¢log²i,t)Stricter merger criterion 2.69% -0.485 0.118
std(¢log²i,t)Shorter in sample 2.46% -0.485 0.122
std(¢log²i,t)Standard Perpetual Inventory 2.64% -0.492 0.119
Notes: See notes to Table 31.
Figure11: TimeSeriesoftheDispersionsofFirm-LevelValueAddedandSalesInnovations(Nor-
malized by the Average Dispersion) and the Cyclical Component of GDP






















Notes: See notes to Table 31.
65Figure 12: Scatter Plot between the Cross-sectional Dispersion of Firm-Level Solow Residual
Innovations and the Cyclical Component of GDP
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Figure 13: Scatter Plots between the Cross-sectional Dispersion of Firm-Level Value
Added/Sales Innovations and the Cyclical Component of GDP
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66Figure 14: Time Series of the Dispersion of Firm-Level Solow Residual Innovations and the IFO
Uncertainty Index






















Notes: Both time series are linearly detrended and normalized by their time-series standard deviation.
67B.2 Further Robustness on the Simulation Results
In this subsection, we provide one further robustness on our three quantitative results: the
inability of the pure ‘Risk Model’ to produce realistic business cycles; the small changes in the
secondmomentanalysisthataddinguncertaintyshockstoastandardﬁrstmomentshock‘RBC
Model’ brings; and the interpretation of these changes as largely due to a bad news effect that
uncertainty shocks entail. Speciﬁcally, (Table 39), we more than triple the adjustment costs
parameter, ¯ », and set it to unity. This is to check whether higher nonconvex adjustment costs
could give the wait-and-see effect are larger role. We ﬁnd that this is not the case.
Finally, (Table 40), we compare the baseline results with the ones from a seemingly unre-
lated regressions (SUR) speciﬁcation for the aggregate driving force, (2), i.e. a speciﬁcation,
where the off-diagonal elements of %A are restricted to zero. This is interesting for two reasons:
ﬁrst, this speciﬁcation mitigates somewhat the obvious problems with estimating a bivariate
VAR with 7 independent parameters from 2£26 data points. We show that both the actual es-
timates of the remaining VAR parameters as well as the implications for our simulation results
are remarkably robust. Secondly, Table 40 shows that most of the changes between the ‘RBC
Model’ and the ‘Full/News Model’ are mainly due to the interaction effect between aggregate
Solowresidualsandﬁrm-leveluncertainty, thatintheunrestrictedbaselinespeciﬁcationisem-
bodied in the negative VAR coefﬁcient of tomorrow’s (but known today) ﬁrm-level uncertainty
on tomorrow’s aggregate Solow residual, an effect that we identiﬁed as a bad news effect.
68Table 39: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS - HIGHER ADJUSTMENT COSTS (¯ »Æ1)
Full News RBC Risk
Model Model Model Model Data
Volatility
of Output 3.86% 4.07% 3.06% 0.29% 2.30%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.36 0.34 0.42 0.78 0.78
Investment 4.40 4.50 4.13 7.00 1.90
Employment 0.70 0.72 0.66 1.47 0.78
Persistence
Output 0.42 0.46 0.31 0.53 0.48
Consumption 0.63 0.62 0.50 0.49 0.67
Investment 0.35 0.41 0.26 0.27 0.42
Employment 0.33 0.41 0.26 0.25 0.61
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.89 0.90 0.90 -0.05 0.66
Investment 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.85 0.83
Employment 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.81 0.68
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.80 0.81 0.79 -0.57 0.60
Employment 0.76 0.79 0.75 -0.63 0.36
Notes:
Business cycle statistics of aggregate output, Y , consumptionC, investment I and employment N. N in the model
includes the amount of labor used to adjust the ﬁrms’ capital stocks. All variables are logged and then HP-ﬁltered
withasmoothingparameterof100. TheﬁrstnumbersinacolumnrefertoasimulationofthemodeloverT Æ1500
periods.
69Table 40: AGGREGATE BUSINESS CYCLE STATISTICS - SUR
Full Full News News RBC
Model Model Model Model Model
SUR SUR
Volatility
of Output 4.04% 3.11% 4.24% 3.18% 3.17%
Volatility of aggregate variables relative to output volatility
Consumption 0.32 0.44 0.30 0.38 0.38
Investment 4.71 4.40 4.77 4.45 4.36
Employment 0.74 0.70 0.76 0.71 0.70
Persistence
Output 0.42 0.21 0.46 0.23 0.31
Consumption 0.66 0.58 0.65 0.54 0.54
Investment 0.34 0.11 0.41 0.17 0.26
Employment 0.33 0.10 0.40 0.17 0.25
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Output
Consumption 0.84 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.86
Investment 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.97
Employment 0.97 0.93 0.98 0.96 0.96
Contemporaneous Correlation with Aggregate Consumption
Investment 0.73 0.59 0.75 0.71 0.73
Employment 0.69 0.52 0.72 0.67 0.69
Notes: See notes to Table ??. SUR means a speciﬁcation of the aggregate driving force, where the off-diagonal










. Recall that the
autocorrelation for the ‘RBC Model’ is 0.5259, and the standard deviation of the innovation is 0.0182.
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